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Traditionally, military commanders have had both the responsibility and the
authority for making a wide range of decisions necessary for the operation oi
their bases and stations. The authority for these decisions is rooted in the ability
to allocate scarce resources against competing needs and the flexibility to
determine which needs should be met at a given time. This flexibility is eroded
whenever the total budget authority is reduced while requirements are held
constant, or the spending requirements for the command are increased while the
budget is held constant, or a simultaneous combination of both phenomena.
Over the past several years, the politicization of the budget process and
changes resulting from congressional defense budget legislation have greatly
impacted the decision-making capabilities and processes of today's military
commanders. One of the most significant impacts has been diminished budget
flexibility for military commanders at the base and station level.
Increased congressional requirements have trickled down through the DoD,
the Department of the Navy (DoN), and Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC).
At every level, the need to respond quickly to congressional budget inquiries has
led to an increase in the amount of funding that is centrally managed and
directed. For example, not only does the Defense Appropriations bill for 1992
contain specific line-item directions in the Operation and Maintenance, Marine
Corps (O&MMC) appropriation, according to the appropriation sponsor at
Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC), this appropriation is further divided into
31 centrally managed funds within the Marine Corps.
The net effect of these restrictions on O&MMC spending is a decrease in the
budget flexibility o( the base and station commanders who depend on the
O&MMC appropriation for the majority of their budget functions. As stated
earlier, if increased restrictions are combined with decreased total funding levels,
budget flexibility is further degraded.
This research will highlight the impact of increased congressional and higher
headquarters budgetary requirements on base and station commanders. This
thesis is important to the field of study because little previous research
documenting the impact of congressional and higher headquarters requirements
on the budget flexibility of installation commanders has been identified. This
study will begin to fill this gap.
B. OBJECTIVES
This thesis will first establish the existence of decreasing budget flexibility
through historical analysis of discretionary spending amounts in the Operation
and Maintenance Marine Corps (O&MMC) Appropriation for base and station
budgets in the Pacific. We will then identify the major contributing factors or
sources of this decrease in Commanding Officers' budget flexibility. The sources
to be discussed include the following:
• macro-economic and national policy developments which have resulted in
a shrinking defense budget.
• increased oversight and spending requirements mandated by Congress.
• spending requirements levied upon commanders by the Department of
Defense (DoD) budget chain.
The discussion of sources of reduced flexibility will be followed by an
analysis of the impact of budgetary restrictions on base and station commanders.
This analysis will focus on the required trade-offs involved in the allocation of
scarce resources to competing functional requirements.
Finally, this thesis will present some possible solutions to the commander's
budget dilemma. These solutions will be formulated based upon the results of our
research, and recommendations from financial managers, comptrollers and
commanding officers throughout the Marine Corps.
C THE RESEARCH QUESTION
Primary: What is the impact of increased spending requirements and
decreased funding on the budget flexibility of base and station commanders?
Subsidiary:
1. What portion of base and station budgets is non- discretionary?
2. To what extent has the discretionary portion of base and station budgets
been reduced from fiscal year 1988 to the present?
3. What are the sources of decreased discretionary funding or increased
requirements?
4. What budget strategies or other alternatives can the commander employ
in order to maximize his budgetary resources, given the number of higher
headquarters and congressional mandates?
5. What changes can be made to existing budget fences and restrictions to
allow commanding officers increased flexibility in making resource
allocation decisions?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
1. Scope
The scope of this thesis is an analysis of the impact of increased
spending requirements and decreased funding on the budget flexibility of Marine
Corps base and station commanders within the Pacific. The focus of this research
will be the O&MMC appropriation. Other appropriation accounts were excluded
because of their irrelevance to the issue of installation budget flexibility.
The specific installations we examined are as follows: Marine Corps Air
Stations (MCAS), Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii and El Toro, California, and Marine Corps
Base (MCB) Camp Pendleton, California. No other installations were included due
to time and monetary constraints.
Budget execution data gathered from the above installations is from
fiscal years (FY) 1988 to 1992.
2. Limitations
Due to limited requirements for retention of official documents, we
were unable to obtain comprehensive data for any installation prior to FY 1988.
In addition, varying retention practices among installations created difficulties in
obtaining completely comparable data for all installations examined.
3. Assumptions
We are assuming readers of this thesis to have a basic knowledge of the
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the relationship
between the legislative and executive branches in the context of budgetary
matters. We further assume readers possess a rudimentary understanding of
congressional oversight of the defense budget.
E. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
1. Literature Review
We have drawn upon professional literature in the areas of budget
execution, congressional oversight, and the defense budget. Our purpose in
studying this literature is to establish the importance of budget execution
flexibility and the negative impact of congressional oversight and a decreasing
defense budget on the budget flexibility of installation commanders.
2. Methodology
Research data for this thesis has been collected in a number of different
ways. Archival research on the background of budget flexibility, congressional
oversight, and the defense budget was conducted using literature addressing
these topics. The necessary archival budget data has been gathered during site
visits to the installations identified in the Scope paragraph. Potential solutions to
minimize the decreasing budget flexibility problem have been solicited through
personal and telephone interviews with financial managers throughout the Marine
Corps. Our analysis will establish trends in budgetary restrictions for base and
station commanders. Sources of restrictions will be identified wherever possible.
F. ABBREVIATIONS
Appendix A contains a complete list of the abbreviations used in this thesis.
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
This thesis will explore the premise that flexibility of budget execution at the
base and station command level is more likely to result in an efficient allocation
of scarce resources than is increased control of funds by higher headquarters.
As outlined above, we will establish, through research of installation
budgets, that budget flexibility for installation commanders has eroded since 1988.
Our goals will be to highlight the impact on Marine Corps installations of budget
restrictions by higher authority and to provide recommendations for increasing
the budget flexibility of these installations. Although our research is based on data
generated at Marine Corps installations, this thesis relates directly to budget
execution within all branches of the military, and the federal government.
Our first effort will be to define budget flexibility and to discuss its
importance to the installation commander. This discussion will incorporate
references to traditional Marine Corps leadership as well as a thorough review of
pertinent literature on the topic of budget flexibility.
Following the chapter on budget flexibility, we will provide the reader with
a historical background on the development of the congressional oversight
process, higher headquarter funding controls, and the declining Department of
Defense (DoD) budget. These chapters are intended to document the mechanisms
which have significant impact on budget flexibility levels.
As we shift our focus toward the actual data and findings of our research,
we will introduce the Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps (O&MMC)
appropriation budget, tracking its composition and flow from Congress to the
installation commander level. Here we will identify specific budgetary restrictions
imposed on installation commanders, with special attention given to the sources
and rationales for these restrictions.
At this point we will present the data gathered in support of our research
and perform analysis and interpretation of these data. This analysis consists of a
comparison of an installation's fixed costs and higher authority spending
requirements with the financial resources that are made available to the local
commander. As will be shown, the former are rising while the latter is falling.
Once the data have been analyzed, we will highlight the impact of decreasing
budget flexibility.
In addition, because of the importance of the Defense Business Operations
Fund (DBOF) and its potential impact on budget flexibility for installation
commanders, we will include a brief discussion of the implications of the DBOF
for local commanders' budget flexibility.
Following our discussion of the impact of decreasing flexibility, we will offer
potential solutions and recommendations. The final chapter will present our
conclusions.
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II. BUDGET FLEXIBILITY AND THE BUDGET BATTLEFIELD
As evidenced by the title of this thesis, our research centers on the issue of
budget flexibility. Before we begin examining the installation budgets that
comprise our data, we must first define budget flexibility and why it is important
to installation commanders. We will establish that flexibility at the installation
commander level is integral to the efficient allocation of financial resources and
that continued shrinking of budget flexibility will exacerbate DoD inefficiency.
A. WHAT IS BUDGET FLEXIBILITY?
One of the simplest ways to explain the concept of budget flexibility is in
battlefield terminology. In this sense, the installation commander is essentially
doing battle by employing scarce resources to combat rising costs in the support
of Fleet Marine Force units. The point here is battlefield initiative. Initiative is
what budget flexibility is all about. For over 217 years, Marine Corps leaders have
been instilled with the importance of exercising initiative. From the raising of a
small force of mercenaries by Lieutenant Presley O'Bannon in the war with the
Barbary pirates, to the daring nighttime attacks across the trenches by General
John A. Lejeune's Second Division in World War I, to the appropriation of U.S.
Army vehicles in order to prevent their theft by the enemy during the Gulf War,
one trait above all others has been lauded in Marine leaders of every
era—initiative. When executed with maturity of thought, within the guidelines
expressed by higher headquarters, and with knowledge of the activities of
adjacent units, initiative is what sets the extraordinary commander apart from the
rest.
Budget flexibility then, like battlefield initiative, is the ability to adjust to
change, to take advantage of windows of opportunity as they arise to achieve
operational efficiency objectives. In short, it is the freedom given a commander
to execute a budget unfettered by excessive restrictions, in a manner dictated by
the situation at hand, rather than by the situation anticipated eighteen months to
two years earlier. Looked at another way, budget flexibility at the command level
is the authority to execute the missions for which the commander has been given
responsibility, determined by sound judgement, which is a prerequisite for
achieving command.
The term flexibility will be utilized both qualitatively and quantitatively
throughout this thesis. An algorithm useful for quantifying a specific dollar
amount of execution flexibility resident in any installation budget is developed
in the section on methodology. In addressing the qualitative dimension of budget
flexibility, it is imperative to analyze why budget flexibility is important to
installation commanders. The next section will provide an answer to this question.
10
B. WHY IS BUDGET FLEXIBILITY IMPORTANT?
Referring again to our battlefield initiative metaphore, there are three
reasons why budget flexibility is important. First, as outlined above, Marine
Corps commanders are expected to display initiative in dealing with the obstacles
which they encounter. By tying the commander's hands with excessive budgetary
restrictions, we are sending the conflicting message that initiative and adaptation
to changing circumstances are not important.
Second, if a commander's budget flexibility is eroded to the point where
virtually no initiative can be exercised, we are diminishing the effectiveness of one
of the most important weapons we possess in the battle against inefficient
allocation of financial resources, i.e., the use of good judgement by commanders
and comptrollers. In the current austere budget environment, the Marine Corps
cannot afford budgetary inefficiency.
Third, the commander is in a much better position than higher authorities
to determine the most efficient allocation of resources for the day-to-day
operations of the installation. In combat, few, if any, headquarters issue detailed
orders to their maneuver elements that describe the exact actions to be taken over
every foot of ground to be covered. Flexibility is maintained by issuing brief
orders (fragmentary or "frag" orders) that outline the objectives to be achieved,
and the situation and resources at hand. The actual details of the scheme of
maneuver are left to the subordinate commander to determine. As requirements
emerge for greater resources (such as close air support), they are requested from
11
higher headquarters or the appropriate support element. Higher headquarters
have the intelligence assets to maintain the big picture, but they realize that the
big picture is always somewhat dated. As a result, victory typically can be
achieved best by assigning appropriate resources to the unit charged with a
mission, and then allowing that unit's commander to employ those resources as
he sees fit using flexible judgement and discretion.
The concept of budget flexibility for installation commanders is similar if not
identical. Higher headquarters should process requests for additional resources
to meet emerging requirements, manage the big picture of financial and
budgetary objectives, and apprise commanders of forecasted changes in the fiscal
environment. But the freedom to execute should be delegated to the maneuver
elements in the battle for streamlined budgets—the commanders of support
installations.
The first three reasons given for the importance of budget flexibility are
somewhat subjective. Some critics would argue that budgets have more to do
with business than battlefields. We maintain that the current budget environment
closely approximates a battleground. Further, we have not neglected the fact that
budget management is a topic that allows parallels to be drawn between military
management efficiency and management in the private sector.
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C. THE PRIVATE SECTOR COMPARISON
The DoD has recently attempted to operate in a more "business-like" manner
through the implementation of practices such as Total Quality Management
(TQM) and the Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF). Consequently, we
have examined a great deal of contemporary research conducted on the subject
of budget flexibility in the private sector, and have discovered that there is wide
applicability to military budgeting.
Specifically, much of this research has been performed and many articles
written on the subject of managers and their budgets. For our purposes in
analyzing these articles, we equate the installation commander with a division
manager, and Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC), DoD and Congress as
separate echelons of corporate headquarters, all having a role to play in the
budget process.
1. Budget Participation
Much of the relevant management literature focuses on the topic of
budget participation at the manager level, and the impact this has on motivation,
performance and efficiency. Budget participation takes two separate forms:
participation in the formulation of budgets, and participation in the execution of
budgets. Arguably, the DoD budget formulation process is completely
participatory, in that the budget is built from successive layers of input, starting
at the lowest level and moving upward. Even this assumption is open to
interpretation, since frequently the budget which is passed down for execution
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bears little resemblance to the one submitted during formulation, and a
commander is left to ponder the value of submitting a request in the first place.
Likewise, a commander may be constrained by a budget formulated
by a previous commander, with different priorities, who has since transferred out
of the organization. Be that as it may, the focus of this thesis is on budget
execution. Effective management participation in the execution of budgets, as
determined in the literature, lies in the degree of freedom, or flexibility, that the
manager possesses to deviate from the budget which is handed down from
corporate headquarters.
In their 1986 study of managers in the electronics and steel industries,
Brownell and Mclnnis found that "a strong positive relationship is found in the
study between participation and managerial performance." [Ref. l:p. 597]. They
further stated that "participation may lead to such things as the introduction of
improvements, at the suggestion of the participating manager" [Ref. l:pp. 597-
598]. This ties into the concepts of TQM.
2. TQM
As formulated by its creator, Dr. W. Edwards Deming, TQM is an
approach to managing change and innovation. One of the primary points oi TQM
is that upper management must foster an environment in which subordinates feel
empowered to eliminate wasteful procedures. It is, after all, the worker on the
shop floor, and not the manager in the front office, who is most likely to see
which cogs are not meshing on the production line.
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This concept carries over to budget execution where efficiency
problems already exist. If DoD is serious about implementation of TQM, and is
not just paying it lip service, the installation commanders who execute the budget
at the "shop floor" supervisory level should be endowed with the ability to effect
changes in the execution process. Just as in Dr. Deming's TQM teachings,
commanders should be educated as to the intent of higher authority but, then
they must be given the flexibility to exercise initiative and to make decisions
leading to efficient outcomes.
3. Fostering Cooperation
A separate, but no less important issue is that lack of participation and
flexibility can create antagonism within and between budget activities and a
defensive posture among managers. In an organization such as the Marine Corps,
which has a highly decentralized command structure, an increasingly centralized
budget execution process threatens the authority of installation commanders.
Bruns and Waterhouse (1975) state:
as the organization becomes more centralized and less autonomous,
individuals perceive having less independence and more interference from
superiors and subordinates on budget matters [Ref. 2:p. 195].
Increased perception of interference, in turn, leads to increased "dissatisfaction
with the usefulness of budgets and perceptions of the flexibility and innovation
they encourage" [Ref. 2:p. 196]. Similarly, Kamin and Ronen (1981) posit that, "the
more structured budget decreases the flexibility needed to motivate subordinates"
[Ref. 3:p. 472].
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Carruth and McClendon (1984) go one step further in arguing that "it
appears that the greater the control established over budgets, the more defensive
the supervisor becomes" [Ref. 4:p. 521. They follow this line of reasoning reaching
the following conclusion:
This 'protect myself attitude may cause supervisors to wear blinders and
concentrate more than ever on their individual worlds. Budgets are
supposed to improve communications and, to some extent, cooperation
between units. As defensive activities increase, unit biases will become more
pronounced; and it is less likely that these biases will be set aside or that the
interest of the individual supervisor will be subordinated to the benefit of
the organization [Ref. 4:p. 52].
The full cooperation of all participants in the budget process is
necessary if we hope to increase efficiency in Marine Corps base operations
budgets. The Marine Corps cannot afford to antagonize the very people who are
largely responsible for determining the most efficient allocation of resources for
each installation. As Carruth and McClendon state, "it generally is accepted that
participation in budget affairs. ..helps to motivate personnel and leads to a higher
level of commitment to organizational goals" [Ref. 4:p. 53].
4. Locating Decision Authority at the Action Point
Thus far we have asserted that the installation commander is in a better
position in budget execution to determine an efficient allocation of resources than
are higher authorities. This point is not one which can be considered as given.
However, considerable research supports this contention.
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For example, Merchant (1981) is in complete agreement with this
position. He notes that "in more diversified firms, lower-level managers are likely
to be better informed about the capabilities of their specialized activities" [Ref. 5:p.
815]. The Marine Corps is certainly a diversified firm, with each installation
having its own special requirements that cannot be blanketed across the spectrum.
Brownell (1982) concurs that in organizations that face a great deal of
day-to-day uncertainty in their budgetary environments, "it will often be the case
that the best information base to support managerial decisions will be located at
the action point rather than with top management" [Ref. 6:p. 776]. The essence of
the problem is that the decision-making authority is removed farther away from
the action point with every step up the chain of command; the greater the
distance, the less the local problem, impact and solutions are understood. The
result of moving control farther away from the action point is the creation of a
less responsive, centralized organization. Blandin and Melese (1991) summarize
the danger inherent in centralized controls:
As an extreme case, consider the predicament of managers in the Soviet
Union. Historically, the Soviet planning process has acted to fix most, if not
all, inputs. The manager is left with little discretion over resource allocation
decisions. The Soviet manager thus merely executes a plan, with no regard
for the economically efficient use of inputs. Over-centralization and
inflexible production processes have contributed to the present disastrous
state of the Soviet economy. This situation makes a powerful case for more
decentralized managerial decision-making [Ref. 7:p. 16].
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Although this quote is related to production processes, it applies directly to the
budget context as well. The inputs for a installation commander are the funds
authorized for expenditure. If the uses of those funds are specified to the degree
that the commander has no discretion over resource allocation decisions, those
inputs can be seen as fixed, just as in the Soviet production processes above. The
result is the same: an inefficient allocation of scarce resources.
A counter argument can be made that decentralized budget execution
will lead to chaos, and the failure of installation commanders to support
programs which are important to higher headquarters. However, as stated earlier,
sound judgement is a prerequisite for selection for command. The command
screening process in the Marine Corps is more thorough now than it has ever
been. In addition, the commander must be held accountable for executing the
budget in such a fashion that official policies are not subverted. Carruth and
McClendon sum up the argument as follows:
Therefore, a certain amount of flexibility on the part of supervisors
concerning how budgeted funds are used may be highly desirable. Holding
the supervisor accountable for the results of his decisions supplies the
desired balance to the greater freedom oi actions given individual
supervisors [Ref. 4:p. 53].
In financial management, commanders should be accorded the authority,
discretion and trust that they must have earned to have attained command status.
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D. THE UNIFIED BUDGET TEST
The DoD conducted a test of the discretionary concept, i.e., according the
installation commanders a greater amount of trust, and giving them a level of
execution flexibility unprecedented in recent years. According to a March 1988
special report from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William H. Taft IV, entitled
The Unified Budget Test, the purpose of the test was to challenge commanders to
"improve their ability to carry out their assigned missions by eliminating the
predetermined subdivisions in their budgets" [Ref. 8:p. 3].
The conditions of the test were as follows:
No additional money was given to the six commanders... Commanders at
the test installations were to have the greatest flexibility the Department
could provide them consistent with the law and Congressional direction...
commanders at these installations were to be free to 'trade-in' money from
one account for money from another... The Service comptrollers made sure
that no more money was spent in any single account than the Congress had
authorized and appropriated... The Deputy Secretary also stated that he
wanted at least four major accounts included in the test: operation and
maintenance, procurement, military construction, and military family
housing [Ref. 8:pp. 3-9].
The test was designed to simulate a unified budget, which the report describes
as "one without predetermined subdivisions of funds" [Ref. 8:p. 3]. Obviously
there were some restrictions which could not be totally removed, but the
flexibility granted to the test commanders was quite extensive in terms of freedom
to move money between appropriations and accounts.
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In addition to eliminating some of the administrative and legal restrictions
faced by the commanders in the test, one service took the test a step further and
extended flexibility across fiscal years. According to the report, this was done
"...within the law by returning money to headquarters for use by other
installations during the budget year. The installation had money added to its
budget the following year" [Ref. 8:p. 9]. This allowed the commander to become
more efficient because he was released from the DoD dilemma of "spend it or lose
it." This policy is perhaps one of the strongest barriers to budget execution
efficiency because, as the report states, "Taking money away from people who
don't spend all of it and giving it to people who run out of money rewards bad
managers and punishes good ones" [Ref. 8:p. 7].
The results from the first year of the Unified Budget Test (UBT) were
unequivocally positive. The following is a compilation of the results included in
the special report:
The most important result was a real increase in mission performance. The
Army, which ran the most sophisticated test, demonstrated a three percent
increase in mission effectiveness at both its test installations. Analysis of the
'trade-ins' at the six test installations showed that most of the money was
in the right place
—
just where it was predicted to be needed three years
earlier. But between seven and ten percent of the money was in the wrong
place. One military department found that the trades tended to balance
without correction at year's end. That means the rigid controls and countless
hours of checking and re-checking, auditing and re-auditing, inspecting and
re-inspecting are unnecessary. The Department can move to a system that
measures the effective use of money from a system which tracks whether
the guesswork of three years ago was accurate [Ref. 8:pp. 11-12].
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The most important result of the test is demonstrated by the following
statement from the special report: "The test in each of the Services, though
different, proved the assumptions were true: our commanders were better
managers than the rules allowed them to be, and freeing them to manage better
meant the nation could get more value for every defense dollar" [Ref. 8:p. 11].
The UBT strongly supports the basis for our thesis-that increased budget
execution flexibility at the installation commander level will result in greater
efficiency and economy for the DoD. It is unfortunate that this test was
undertaken during a time when the drive for greater efficiency had not reached
a high enough level to allow it to gain greater visibility and acceptance.
E. CONCLUSIONS ON FLEXIBILITY
This thesis does not advocate a total abrogation of control by Headquarters.
On the contrary, it establishes the importance of flexibility in budget execution for
installation commanders. Obviously, certain restrictions or parameters are a part
of any senior/subordinate relationship, but there exists a limit beyond which a
subordinate's ability to accomplish the mission efficiently is greatly impeded.
With any organization, the key to good financial management is to create an
operating structure that accomplishes the mission in the most effective and
efficient manner. As higher authorities impose an increasing number of
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restrictions upon subordinates, subordinate flexibility is reduced. Specific
recommendations will be made in this thesis on methods for increasing flexibility.
In closing this chapter, one more thought from Carruth and McClendon
captures the importance of budget flexibility and the central theme of this thesis:
Administration of the budget should not be rigid. Changed conditions
warrant changes in plans. Superiors should place the proper emphasis on
budgetary activities to instill a cost-conscious, cooperative attitude toward
budgetary control in supervisors. A skeptical supervisory attitude will filter
down within the unit, and may undermine organizational efficiency. The
budget must receive respect but it must not prevent a supervisor from
taking prudent action [Ref. 4:p. 54].
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III. CONGRESS AND THE BUDGET FLEXIBILITY DILEMMA
Chapter II established the importance of budget flexibility for installation
commanders. Since this thesis will show that budget flexibility has been
decreasing over time, it is useful to identify the forces that act to erode budget
flexibility.
The discretionary, or flexible, portion of a commander's budget can be








A declining budget squeezes flexibility from the top. On the other hand,
increasing spending requirements, in the form of greater directed spending from
higher authority and growing fixed costs, press up on flexibility from below. Top
down decreases in flexibility, the result of diminishing budget resources, are the
topic of the next chapter. This chapter will cover Congress's impact on flexibility
reductions from the bottom, resulting from increasing appropriation and related
spending requirements.
While there are many sources of spending requirements, including the fixed
costs of base operations, Congress deserves particular attention. Congress earns
the right to its own chapter because it can affect budget flexibility in so many
ways.
This chapter will first explore congressional oversight of defense spending,
giving a definition of and basis for oversight by Congress, followed by a historical
presentation of how we have arrived at the current situation. Next will be an
analysis of the impact of congressional activities on DoD. Finally, some additional
thoughts concerning Congress and its effect on budget flexibility will be
presented.
A. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF DOD: WHAT IS IT, AND WHY IS
IT?
Congressional oversight is different things to different people. Some would
say that Congress was exercising its oversight duties when it was rubber-
stamping DoD budget requests in the 1950s. Others would maintain that Congress
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can never keep too close an eye on the "fools, thieves and charlatans" in the
Pentagon. Lindsay defines oversight as:
those activities by which Congress seeks to determine whether the executive
branch is acting in compliance with legislative intent and, where this is not
the case, to bring the executive branch into compliance with that intent
[Ref. 9:pp. 8-9].
Basically, oversight is maintaining a watchful eye on the activities of the executive
branch to ensure that the power of the executive is used appropriately, in
accordance with legislative mandates, and is not abused.
The historical basis for congressional oversight of national security matters
is the Constitution of the United States. This document sets forth broad powers
for Congress in the pursuit of the defense of our nation. Along with the powers
identified below, comes the responsibility to ensure that the directions given are
being carried out. This is oversight. Owens (1990) identifies the following powers
granted to Congress in this area:
the power to raise funds to 'provide for the common Defence'; to raise and
support armies, and the militia when in federal service; to provide and
maintain a navy; to make rules for the government and regulation of the
land and naval forces; to 'exercise exclusive legislation... over all places
purchased... for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and
other needful buildings'; and to make all laws necessary and proper for
carrying out the other powers [Ref. 10:p. 132].
Indeed, no one questions the right or responsibility of Congress to perform
the duty of oversight. The question to be answered is, at what level should
Congress focus to ensure compliance with its intent? Should it be concerned with
budgetary minutiae, or with broad and farsighted policy concerns?
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We could ask this same question of members of both the Continental
Congress and today's Congress, and likely get similar answers. As Owens states,
"The Founders envisioned a body dedicated primarily to deliberation—reasoned
debate on issues of broad policy" [Ref. 10:p. 141]. The framers of the Constitution
saw the need for long range vision and careful consideration of the impact of the
actions of Congress.
Many oi today's members have similar beliefs. Senator Sam Nunn, chairman
of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), testifying before the Temporary
Select Committee to Study the Senate Committee System in August 1984, put it
this way:
The Armed Services Committee now authorizes almost every element of the
defense budget each year, down to almost the last screw and bolt.... At its
worst this tendency has spurred not unreasonable charges of congressional
'micromanagement'.... But even more troublesome, this trend to
micromanagement has the staff and members focusing on the grains of sand
on the beach while we should be looking over the broad ocean and beyond
the horizon [Ref. ll:Part 2, p. 64].
It appears to be nearly unanimous among most Congress-watchers, and even
within Congress, that we have reached a point at which the members of Congress
bring electron microscopes to a task perhaps more adequately performed with
telescopes. Some even question whether Congress is capable of performing the
oversight for which the Constitution grants it the power [Ref. 9:p. 7].
This questioning of the capacity of Congress to perform a basic and vital
function is not new, but it is exacerbated by the current climate of
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micromanagement. The following quote from Lindsay (1990), often cited in the
literature on the subject, gives insight into the views of many policy experts.
"Congress," according to Lindsay, "is a political institution and not a bureaucratic
one. Because it lacks the attributes of a bureaucracy, Congress's ability to review
and revise DoD policies is limited; it is not capable of comprehensive oversight"
[Ref. 9:p. 7].
If Congress is not capable of comprehensive oversight of DoD, how then can
it afford to spend so much time "focusing on the grains of sand?" Certainly
Congress is required to ensure that DoD does not overspend its budget. Congress
also has a responsibility to the taxpayer to monitor the efficiency with which DoD
spends its funds. But, it is the effort by Congress to gain greater control over the
defense budget which frequently undermines DoD efficiency. Is further
micromanagement the answer? Perhaps a better question to be asked is: how did
we arrive at our current situation of micromanagement?
B. THE GRADUAL PATH TO MICROMANAGEMENT: STAGE I
As alluded to earlier, there have been periods in the past in which Congress
exercised much less restrictive control over DoD and its budget. In discussing the
power of the defense committees during the 1950s and 1960s, Lindsay states that
"None of the defense committees made extensive changes to DoD budget requests
in the 1960s. In general, members of these committees saw their task as the
military's advocate on Capitol Hill" [Ref. 12:p. 378].
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The first indication of a change in the wind was the passage of the Russell
amendment in 1959. Prior to this piece of legislation, the House and Senate
Armed Services Committees (HASC and SASC) provided lump-sum
authorizations for most DoD programs. It was the Defense Appropriations
Subcommittees which had the power to control the purse strings, due to their
ability to make adjustments to the defense budget at the line-item level.
The Russell amendment was the first of many steps toward giving the
Armed Services Committees greater power vis-a-vis the Defense Appropriations
Subcommittees. According to Lindsay, the amendment "stipulated that after 1960
all appropriations for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels had
to be preceded by specific annual authorizations" [Ref. 12:p. 375]. This power of
annual authorization has gradually been extended to all aspects of the defense
budget, until we have reached the point where the efforts of the Armed Services
committees and the Defense Appropriations subcommittees are almost completely
duplicative of each other, and of executive branch efforts as well. According to
Ippolito (1990), "Congress now duplicates much of the president's work. Lacking
the centralization and hierarchy of the executive branch, however, Congress often
finds it difficult to make clear-cut and binding decisions" [Ref. 13:p. 115].
This duplication of effort would not, in and of itself, necessarily be a
problem for the DoD. As Ippolito intimates though, the problem arises in that the
two sets of committees frequently contradict each other: funds which are
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authorized are not always appropriated, and funds which are appropriated are
not always authorized. In addition, this duplication of effort has resulted in
defense budgets which are now consistently passed well after the beginning of the
fiscal year. All these effects combine to tie up funds DoD needs to execute its
budget efficiently.
The power struggle between the Armed Services Committees and the
Defense Appropriations Subcommittees has developed over a period of 30 years,
and contributes strongly to the climate of micromanagement which exists today.
It is not the only force that has been active in the congressional defense arena. It
was, however, the first of many forces to manifest itself in our recent budgetary
history.
C. THE GRADUAL PATH TO MICROMANAGEMENT: STAGE II
While there was significant competition brewing among the defense
committees during the early 1960s, the consensus among the rest of Congress was
that these committees, and especially their chairmen, were the experts on defense
matters. Not only were defense bills rarely challenged on the floor of either
chamber, but DoD itself was held in a position of trust and respect. Vietnam
effected a drastic change on this somewhat idyllic environment from the DoD
perspective.
As Ippolito points out, "the convergence of negative perceptions about
Vietnam, about military waste and mismanagement, and about the leadership and
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competence of the armed services meant that the military's budget was no longer
privileged" [Ref. 13:p. 118]. In a very brief period of time, DoD lost nearly all the
trust that it had possessed on the Hill, and the battle to regain that trust is still
being waged.
The armed services were not the only ones to face the diminished trust and
respect of Congress and the American people. The once mighty chairmen of
congressional committees were being challenged by young, independent-minded
junior members, who began to question authority within the halls of Congress.
Likewise, the defense committees themselves began to be questioned as to their
expertise. As Lindsay (1987) states, "To retain credibility in their parent chambers,
the Armed Services committees (and the Defense Appropriations subcommittees
as well) had to establish that they did not simply rubber-stamp DoD requests"
[Ref. 12:p. 381]. Combining this loss of a sense of advocacy among the defense
committees with the general loss of trust in DoD resulted in increasing attacks on
the defense budget from the floors of both chambers.
These attacks originate not only from individual members of Congress, but
also from increasing numbers of committees and subcommittees which have
experienced profound growth in their influence over defense matters.
Congressional committees have become increasingly active throughout the last
two decades. Many committees with no apparent direct connection to defense
have determined that they do, indeed, have jurisdiction over some aspect of the
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defense budget. As Secretary Cheney stated in his White Paper on the Department
of Defense and the Congress (1990), "In 1988, 14 full committees and 43
subcommittees or panels held hearings concerning DoD. Some 30 committees and
77 subcommittees claim some degree of oversight responsibility for DoD"
[Ref. 14:p. 15]. This tremendous growth in committee involvement with the DoD
budget has reinforced the trend toward micromanagement.
Add to the growth of the committees and the independence oi members at
large the increasing politicization of the defense budget, and micromanagement
has begun to mushroom uncontrollably. Defense spending is seen as a political
symbol of liberal versus conservative. Hardliners on both sides can use their
stands on defense issues as tangible evidence of their dedication to ideological
principles. As Ippolito asserts:
The political symbolism of defense spending and domestic budget priorities
had made budget resolutions convenient targets for ideological battles since
the mid-1970s. Because defense was the only major authorization coming up
each year in Congress, it provided a splendid opportunity for numerous
members to press their views on weapons systems, procurement reforms,
arms control, and foreign policy. With the defense appropriations bill
comprising the bulk of controllable spending in each year's budget,
incentives were multiplied for fighting over relatively small amounts [Ref.
13:p. 146].
The politicization of the defense budget, combined with the concreteness of ships,
planes, missiles and tanks, has created the ideal platform upon which members
of Congress can use a thirty-second sound bite to reach thousands of voters. Few
other areas of the federal budget are capable of garnering the publicity that
opposition to the defense budget provides.
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D. FORMS OF MICROMANAGEMENT
1. Direct Intervention
Lindsay (1987) provides some startling figures which clearly
demonstrate the growth of micromanagement in the defense budget process due
to increased committee and floor involvement:
In 1969, Congress made 180 changes to the defense authorization bill and
650 to the appropriations bill. In 1975 these figures were 222 and 1,032,
respectively- In 1985, however, Congress made 1,145 adjustments in the
authorization bill and 2,156 in the appropriations bill (representing more
than a sixfold and a threefold increase, respectively, in changes to the
defense authorization and appropriation bills). There has been a similar
jump in congressional directions to DoD. In 1969 Congress requested 36
reports from the Pentagon, directed 18 other actions, and changed 64
provisions in the law. By comparison, in 1985 Congress requested 676
reports (an increase of 1,778%), mandated 184 other directions (992%), and
made 227 changes in the law (255%) [Ref. 12:pp. 373-4].
The net result of all this activity is a growing preoccupation with minute budget
details on the part of Congress, and a resultant inability of DoD to plan and
execute its budget in an efficient manner.
2. Political Pork
In addition to the problems caused by micromanagement, the DoD
budget is especially prone to inefficiencies which are imposed upon it by
Congress through enactment of "pork barrel" legislation. Because defense
spending has become so political, and makes up such a large portion of
controllable spending, this facet of the legislative process has actually become an
incentive for greater micromanagement. Important votes are frequently bought
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and sold by parcelling out defense funds to specific states and congressional
districts. Since many of the items funded were not requested by DoD (indeed,
some have very little to do with defense in the first place), this forced expenditure
of limited funds may benefit certain members of Congress, but is likely to result
in decreased flexibility and efficiency in the execution of DoD budgets.
Having examined the growth of micromanagement within the defense
budget process, the effects which Congress and its activities can have upon
budget flexibility of installation commanders may now be considered.
E. DIRECT CONGRESSIONAL IMPACT ON DEFENSE BUDGET
FLEXIBILITY
The most obvious sources of congressional impact on the DoD budget and
execution flexibility are the line-item changes to the budget itself, and
congressional directions to DoD. The sheer magnitude of these activities, as
outlined above, can impact DoD in many different ways. The largest impact is the
tremendous uncertainty that congressional activity injects in both the budget
planning and budget execution processes.
The fact that any item submitted in the budget request is increasingly likely
to be altered or completely eliminated, greatly reduces the effectiveness of input
from the installation commander level. As asserted earlier, the installation
commander is in an ideal position to determine the most efficient spending
practices for any given installation. Without an accurate assessment of the
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probable impact at the lowest levels, congressional direction and line-item control
are not likely to result in efficient allocation of resources.
Flexibility is further reduced through earmarking of funds for specific
purposes. Rather than identifying project priorities and allowing the local
commander the authority to determine an efficient distribution of funds to
accomplish the mission, Congress frequently earmarks funds for specific uses, and
the money can only be spent in those areas. As Secretary Cheney states, "Many
earmarks direct money to specific recipients, either by name or by virtue of
conditions on the funding—in some cases with little direct relation to genuine
defense needs. In other cases, earmarks represent mandates to spend funds on
what are clearly low-priority items" [Ref. 14:p. 14].
In addition to earmarking, Secretary Cheney identifies another area in which
Congress has a profound impact on budget flexibility. "Another frequent practice
is the establishment of personnel, or workload, floors or requiring the continuance
of specific functions at various installations. There are about a dozen such
requirements in the 1989 defense bills with even more extensive requirements in
permanent law" [Ref. 14:p. 14]. By imposing spending floors on local
commanders, Congress is legislating inefficiency in those cases in which the local
commander could comply with congressional intent while spending less than the
floor.
The direct impact of Congress on defense budget flexibility is certainly
significant, but there is also tremendous indirect impact.
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F. INDIRECT CONGRESSIONAL IMPACT ON DEFENSE BUDGET
FLEXIBILITY
Another potential burden on defense has been the increasing regulation of
federal agencies by other federal agencies or even states. This regulation results
from non-defense federal and state legislation which is increasingly impacting
DoD. According to Secretary Cheney:
This can impose costs or force changes in Department activities without
regard to the overall defense picture. For example, the House Armed
Services Committee 1990 authorization report says that compliance with
environmental legislation will cost DoD $5-$10 over the next five years.
'Unless extraordinary measures are taken to increase defense expenditures,
provide for large transfers of funding within DoD appropriations or
constrain environmental funding requirements, defense readiness and
quality of life programs will have to be sacrificed,'... [Ref. 14:p. 16].
The environmental laws which so strongly affect the defense budget were passed
without any direct input from the defense committees.
Unfortunately, the environment is not the only spending area in which laws
are passed which have a direct and powerful impact on DoD, but on which there
was no consultation with the defense committees. As Secretary Cheney states:
As the largest civilian employer in the government, DoD's performance is
strongly affected by compensation and ethics laws, but the defense
authorizing committees are not usually given an opportunity to take DoD's
particular needs into account while legislation in these areas is being crafted
[Ref. 14:p. 17].
Most defense environmental spending and all defense civilian pay are
funded through the Operation and Maintenance Appropriation (O&M), which is
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the focus of this thesis. But non-defense legislation that impacts DoD is not the
only source of indirect congressional impact on budget flexibility within O&M.
O&M is particularly susceptible to what we call the "trickle-down" effect of
congressional micromanagement.
Congress impacts budget flexibility within DoD even when it does not direct
specific uses for O&M funds. In an interview with an official source in the budget
execution branch of the office of the Fiscal Director of the Marine Corps, it was
learned that many restrictions placed on O&M funds at the DoD and HQMC
levels are imposed in order to avoid congressional attention.
The Marine Corps alone currently uses 31 centrally managed funds, only a
few of which are mandated by Congress. Although these centrally managed funds
reduce flexibility at the installation level, they are viewed as necessary for two
reasons: 1) they demonstrate to Congress an effort to keep spending under tight
control, thereby reducing the chance that Congress will feel "obliged" to take
control into its own hands; and 2) they allow HQMC quicker response time to
numerous congressional requests for information and action. If HQMC centrally
manages funds for any given project, it can provide a more rapid response to
congressional inquiries than if it had to gather up the information from separate
commands. Rapid and accurate responses could preclude Congress from
conducting its own, potentially disruptive, fact-finding effort.
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While the "trickle-down" effect is not as easily documented as direct
congressional action, its pervasiveness makes it one of the largest sources of
restriction on budget execution. Since much of this restriction may be a response
to the perceived threat of congressional intervention, or an attempt to preempt
that intervention, it can be indirectly attributed to the level of micromanagement
within the Congress.
This perceived threat is fostered through unofficial correspondence and
verbal instructions from members and staff of Congress to agents of the DoD. As
Secretary Cheney describes, although DoD "is not required to comply with these
forms of guidance as a legal matter, the consequences of ignoring such advice
frequently compel compliance—this year's ignored 'suggestion' may become next
year's statutory requirement" [Ref. 14:p. 12].
G. TARGET: O&M
1. The Black Hole
Until recently, O&M escaped much of the budget scrutiny that has
been focused on the rest of the defense budget. This is because it was viewed as
being directly related to readiness. Also, because it is made up of so many
disparate line items, it is difficult for Congress to understand. Morrison (1992)
clearly identifies the diversity present within the account:
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O&M pays for training, exercises, spare parts and the maintenance and
repair of property and hardware. It also supports the transport of military
people and their goods around the globe, not to mention health care and
recruiting and the gamut of administrative expenses. O&M also
encompasses military bands, chaplains and recreation. Oh, yes, don't forget
treaty verification, environmental restoration, unemployment compensation
and billions of dollars in classified intelligence activities [Ref. 15:p. 1823].
In the last several years, however, O&M has lost much of the
protection it once enjoyed. Congressman Les Aspin, Chairman of the House
Armed Services Committee, has led a personal crusade against this appropriation
account. According to Congressman Aspin, as quoted by Morrison, "it is 'a myth'
that O&M spending translates directly into readiness....O&M spending, Aspin
concluded, 'is the biggest black hole of all in defense'" [Ref. 15:p. 1822].
2. Instant Returns
O&M is now looked at more closely because of its diversity, and
because of its nature as a fast-spending account (budget authority is usually
outlayed in the appropriation year). It is now increasingly looked upon as a cash
cow. When Congress seeks defense outlays to be used for special defense
programs or non-defense purposes, the O&M budget is an attractive target.
This outlook is to the detriment of installation commanders throughout
DoD, because O&M makes up the vast majority of the funds necessary for base
operations. O&M is also the only real source of flexibility within an installation
commander's budget. All other appropriations are so heavily controlled that a
commander has virtually no decision authority over their use. With increasing
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congressional control over O&M, the last bastion of budget flexibility is under
fire.
3. O-l
Not surprising then, an effort by Congress is now underway to extend
its control over the budgeting and execution of O&M funding. In the FY 1992
Defense Appropriations Conference Report, Congress calls for the following:
To improve the information available on the execution and budgeting of
operation and maintenance (O&M) appropriations, Section 8034 requires the
Department to submit an 'O-l' as part of its justification materials
supporting the fiscal year 1993 O&M request. The conferees agree that the
O-l shall be treated as the base for reprogramming actions and execution of
O&M funds, as the P-l and R-l are for procurement and RDT&E,
respectively [Ref. 16:p. 50].
There are two significant aspects to this new requirement.
First, it establishes that the budget justification material for O&M will
be in the same detailed, line-item format as are the P-l and R-l. The procurement
and RDT&E accounts are among the most extensively fenced and controlled
appropriations. Congress appropriates in these two areas at the line item level,
and the funding is typically difficult to adjust between line items. Given the
diverse nature of the O&M appropriation, building a line-item budget for O&M
will involve massive efforts on the part of DoD, will serve to further bog down
the defense appropriations progress, and will invite even tighter control of budget
execution by the Congress.
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This is the second important issue raised by the O-l, that the wording
in the FY 1992 bill significantly ties execution to the O-l justification by making
it the "base" for execution. In most cases, execution should resemble the proposed
budget. But, as demonstrated by the Unified Budget Test described earlier, the
requirements that emerge at the installation level between the time budgets are
formulated and executed, can be quite unforeseeable.
The FY 1993 House Defense Appropriations Conference Report states
"The conferees do not seek to impede the orderly management of O&M programs
at the base, installation or major command level" [Ref. 17:p. 52]. But, the
establishment of O-l can have no other effect. Even though funds can be switched
between O-l categories during FY 1993, and Congress has stated that it does not
wish to impede DoD budget flexibility, the "trickle-down" effect may generate
increased restrictions throughout the DoD budget hierarchy. The attempt by
Congress to appropriate funds in an ever-tightening grip on execution will result
in substantially increased workloads for budget formulators, and vastly
diminished execution flexibility for the installation commanders. As noted, these
commanders are in need of greater flexibility, not increased control at the highest
level.
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H. CONCLUSIONS ON CONGRESS AND FLEXIBILITY
The premise of this thesis is that budget execution flexibility at the
installation commander level is more likely to lead to an efficient allocation of
resources than is control of funds at higher levels. Congress, in choosing to
exercise its oversight duties by micromanaging the defense budget down to the
line-item level, often in the name of promoting efficiency, is instead stifling
efficiency by taking away flexibility and by causing confusion in the defense
budget process.
According to Secretary Cheney, due to consistently late passage of defense
appropriations well into the fiscal year, and to budget differences between the
authorizing and appropriating committees, Congress places "DoD in a difficult
position, one which can be detrimental to an effective national defense policy, but
which cannot be solved by the Department" [Ref. 14:p. 22]. He further states that
"Inability to settle such disputes can delay needed modernization, waste resources
and divert the attention of policy makers from other critical issues" [Ref. 14:p. 22].
It is likely that adoption of the O-l will hinder rather than help efforts to provide
more consistency in the process.
The direct effects of Congress may be illustrated by examining the fiscal year
(FY) 1992 defense authorization and appropriations bills, specifically the portions
affecting the O&MMC account. In the House version of the authorization bill,
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there were three line-item changes made to the President's budget. The Senate
indicated ten changes, and the conference resulted in nine line-item changes.
In terms of dollars, the President requested $1,894.6 million. The HASC
proposed $1,786.3 million, the SASC proposed $2,170.3 million, and the conference
adopted a figure of $1,845.5 million.
The House and Senate Appropriations Committees (HAC and SAC) were
even more active. The HAC indicated seven line-item changes, the SAC thirteen,
and the Conference adopted twelve. In dollars, the HAC recommended $2,082.5
million, the SAC recommended $2,109.7 million, and amazingly, the conference
arrived at a figure of $1,892.1 million. Even after trimming several million dollars
from the individual recommendations of each chamber, the Conference still
appropriated $46.6 million more than was authorized. [Ref. 18]
The importance of these figures lies not in the fact that the overall dollar
amounts were changed only slightly. These figures show that even in a relatively
small account such as O&MMC, congressional intervention can be substantial.
The figures above identify only a portion of the impact of Congress on
budget flexibility. As outlined in the section on impact, there are many statutes
enacted every year that have a lasting effect on DoD operations, but are not
contained in either the defense authorization or appropriations bills. Many of
these statutes, for example those dealing with the environment and civilian pay,
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have the effect of increasing the fixed costs of base operations. This increase in
fixed costs directly reduces flexibility in budget execution.
Also not included in the direct intervention figures is the serious issue of the
"trickle-down" effect. Congress could refrain from making a single line-item
change to the budget, and the current climate is such that senior managers in the
DoD and Marine Corps would still feel the necessity to maintain centralized
control of funds. This restriction on funding at the installation commander level
is performed in the name of retaining flexibility by discouraging direct
congressional intervention. The net effect is exactly the opposite.
The installation commanders are under fire to become more efficient in their
budget execution. At the same time, flexibility, a key tool in efficient budget
execution, is being dramatically reduced. While Congress and the defense
hierarchy compress the commander's flexibility from below by mandating
expenditures and fencing off access to large portions of O&M funds (see Figure
3.1), there is another force acting to reduce flexibility from above.
The next chapter will analyze the inescapable phenomenon of forced
reduction in the overall defense budget, and the impact this will have on the
O&M account and, consequently, on budget flexibility.
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IV. THE DECLINING DEFENSE BUDGET
In the previous chapter, we examined congressional oversight and, in turn,
how this oversight impacts the flexibility of installation commanders. We
provided an overview of the development of the oversight process into a
microscopic dissection of the entire defense budget. As presented earlier,
contemporary congressional oversight represents a compression, from the bottom
up, of a commander's budget flexibility (Figure 3.1).
In contrast, this chapter presents a source of decreased budget flexibility at
the installation level from the top down—reduced total appropriations for the
DoD. This presentation includes a discussion of the current defense budget
climate; a historical review of the DoD budget—its size relative to other federal
budget components and to the United States (US) economy as measured by the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP); and a discussion of some of the reasons the
defense budget faces further cuts.
Budget data presented in this section will consist mainly of outlays and
budget authority amounts obtained from the Office oi Management and Budget's
(OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) Historical Tables for
subfunction 051 (Department of Defense—Military) of the function 050 (National
Defense). We will cite data for the period 1950-1990 utilizing the format provided
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by Dennis S. Ippolito in Defense Budgets and Spending Control and utilize OMB
estimates for the period 1993-1997.
The defense budget represents just one subset of the overall federal budget.
However, its status as the largest controllable spending account legislated
annually and scrutinized by Congress, has made it the predominant focus of the
congressional budget process in recent years. "The size of the defense budget
impacts on the economy, international negotiations, and the federal government's
ability to achieve other national objectives" [Ref. 19:p. 2].
A. THE DEFENSE BUDGET CLIMATE AND BUDGET FLEXIBILITY
The defense budget climate is integral to the argument of our thesis for two
major reasons. First, if the overall defense appropriation is decreased, budget
allocations, including Operations and Maintenance (O&M) dollars to specific
installations will ceteris paribus, also be decreased, thus reducing a commander's
discretionary dollars. Although there is support in both Congress and the
Executive for maintaining a high degree of readiness (primarily O&M funded),
the force structure reduction of 25 percent, presently underway, has already
contained O&M reductions.
In fact, the FY 1993 O&M appropriation was 1.8 billion dollars less than the
FY 1992 amount [Ref. 20:Part Two, p. 3], it was another six billion dollars below
the amount requested by President Bush [Ref. 21:p. 3260]. According to Towell,
"for the first time in this era of defense cuts, Congress made significant reductions
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in the O&M request. The most notable single initiative. ..was a three billion dollar
reduction linked to a variety of changes in the way the Pentagon manages its
spare parts and supplies" [Ref. 21:p. 3260]. Moreover, the services' O&M budget
requests were immediately reduced by one billion dollars each, apparently to
motivate the services to pare supply warehouses of excess items [Ref. 21:p. 3260].
Second, if Congress and the American public are dissatisfied with DoD's
financial management, additional restrictions may be placed on defense
appropriations, further reducing budget execution flexibility at the local level. As
a case in point, the aforementioned one billion dollar cut of the services' O&M
budget requests was tied to an incentive in which the dollar value of eliminated
excess supplies would be credited to the respective service's operating account
[Ref. 22:p. 2957].
This conditional appropriation manifests two points: 1) Congress believes it
can, and must, legislate efficiency for the DoD, and 2) "the largest slice of the
defense budget pie" [Ref. 15:p. 1822], i.e., the sizeable O&M budget, within an
overall smaller defense pie, is increasingly susceptible to micromanagement and
reduction. We postulate that if congressional oversight continues at its past
growth rate, or even remains constant within a declining DoD budget, the
discretionary portion of a commander's O&M budget—the commander's budget
flexibility—will continue to shrink. Since we maintain that the commander is in
the best position to make resource allocation decisions (Chapter II), increased
oversight will aggravate the problem of inefficient allocation of DoD financial resources.
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B. THE WINDS OF CHANGE
The decades of the nineteen eighty's and nineties have brought several
developments of global, almost biblical, proportion—the end of the Cold War, the
falling of the Berlin Wall, the continued slow down of the American economy, the
escalation of the U.S. federal deficit and national debt, and Desert Shield/ Desert
Storm. These events have synergistically combined to alter the current defense
budget climate.
C. THE FY 93 DEFENSE BUDGET
In the FY 1993 federal budget submission, President Bush requested $267.6
in Budget Authority (BA) and $272.8 billion in outlays for the DoD-Military (051)
function [Ref. 20:Part One, p. 241]. This equates to a real decline in BA of seven
percent below the FY 1992 budget enacted by Congress, excluding Desert
Shield/ Desert Storm costs [Ref. 23:p. 40].
Figure 4.1, the Secretary of Defense's famous "pitchfork" chart, depicts the
DoD's BA levels between FY's 1985 and 1997. These levels represent cumulative
real declines in defense spending of 29 percent for the period 1985-1993 and 37
percent for the period 1985-1997. Markedly, the FY 1993 budget was formulated
and submitted in perhaps the most complex of national security environments.
President Bush's budget included plans to reduce the active-duty force to
a "base force," which was based upon a new military strategy. This strategy
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to crisis situations. The new strategy and the projected environment for its
implementation have brought about significant reductions in the defense budget.
The President's FY 1993 budget submission stated:
Because of the reduced threat of a major war, substantial savings are
possible. Active duty, selected reserve, and civilian personnel levels are
being reduced, and several major weapons programs are being terminated
[Ref. 20:Part One, p. 240].
The Bush budget submission also states, "Active forces will be maintained
at current high readiness levels and equipped with modern equipment to be able
to respond appropriately to continuing threats" [Ref. 20:Part One, p. 240].
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Although a general consensus on threat assessment and the appropriate
defense posture seems to exist, several divergent defense budgets have been
proposed. For example, the proposal by President-elect Clinton, if adopted, will
cut an additional $58.5 billion from the Bush plan in five years [Ref. 24:p. 3254].
The Panetta defense plan includes cuts of $166 billion over six years, and the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recommends defense cuts of
$290 billion over ten years [Ref. 24:p. 3255].
The only sure thing regarding the immediate future for defense is that cuts
will continue to be imposed—where and how much remain in question.
D. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE DEFENSE BUDGET
This section presents an overview of the DoD budget since 1950. This
overview will provide a perspective from which to evaluate the current budget
climate and assess its impact upon budget flexibility.
With few exceptions, defense budget outlays have increased from year to
year in current dollars, but in constant dollars, spending has fluctuated
dramatically with three peaks—Korea, Vietnam, and the Carter-Reagan buildup.
Figure 4.2 illustrates this relationship between current and constant defense
dollars. Despite the fluctuation in constant dollars, the unmistakable trend for
defense spending since the Korean Conflict been downward.
In 1950, defense (051) current dollar outlays totaled $13,724 million,
constituting 32.2 percent of total federal outlays and 5.2 percent of GDP
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[Ref. 25:Part Five, p. 83]. Over four decades later, the DoD Comptroller estimates
1993 defense (051) current dollar outlays at $291,353 billion—19.2 percent of total
federal outlays and 4.7 percent of GDP [Ref. 26:pp. 125,139]. Because the actual
appropriation for FY 1993 was $37 billion less than this estimate, [Ref. 27:p. 3260],
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Certainly, the defense budget climate is in a state of flux. What follows is a
brief examination of the decades between the fifties and the nineties, segmented
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to align with the administrations of the presidents who have shaped these
budgets.
E. THE KENNEDY/JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION
In 1962, defense outlays equaled $52,345 million, 49 percent of total federal
outlays and 9.4 percent of GDP [Ref. 25:Part Five, p. 84]. In 1965, defense outlays
were cut by over seven percent from the 1964 level [Ref. 28:p. 117]. Then came a
rise in defense funding due to the Vietnam War. Between 1965 and 1969, defense
budget outlays increased by more than $31 billion, peaking at $82.5 billion in 1969
dollars [Ref. 27:Part Five, p. 85].
Constant dollar defense outlays peaked at $254.8 billion (FY 82 dollars) in
1968 [Ref. 25:p. 68]. As mentioned in the previous chapter, negative perceptions
toward DoD regarding the war and mismanagement of resources brought about
a change in funding for defense.
F. THE NIXON/FORD ADMINISTRATION
The change in defense funding stemmed from congressional interest in
cutting defense and increasing social spending, and lasted into the mid 1970s.
During the period FY69-FY76 current dollar defense outlays rose from $82.5
billion (almost 45 percent of total federal outlays) to $89.6 billion (less than 25
percent of total federal outlays) while overall federal spending almost doubled
[Ref. 13:p. 119]. In 1976, defense totaled $153.6 billion in terms of real spending
(FY 1982 dollars) and 5.3 percent as a share of the GDP—the lowest level since
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1950 [Ref. 27:p. 69]. Figure 4.3 presents defense outlays as a percentage of GDP
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The period 1970-1975 was highlighted by significant defense budget conflict
between the Executive and the Congress. Defense appropriation bills passed by
Congress averaged nearly $4 billion per year below the Administration's request
[Ref. 13:p. 120]. Congressional actions led to program delays or stretch-outs vice
terminations. High costs of these stretch-outs and of an all-volunteer force altered
the shape of the defense budget. "During the period FY 69-76, outlays for
manpower rose by more than 20 percent while procurement and research,
development, testing and evaluation dropped by about one-fifth" [Ref. 13:p. 120].
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The Nixon administration responded to congressional distrust by tightening
procurement and support activities, and by expanding the capabilities of existing
forces [Ref. 13:p. 120]. The Administration seemed to have been on the right track
to improve relations between Congress and the Administration regarding the
defense budget.
However, this progress was completely reversed by President Nixon's fiscal
impoundments and by the Watergate scandal. Congress utilized these events as
leverage to increase congressional control over the defense budget and passed the
1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act. This Act once again
altered the defense budget process as it placed defense in direct competition with
politically popular and less easily controlled domestic programs. In short, the
Nixon years provided the catalyst for increased congressional oversight.
President Ford prepared the first budget under the Congressional Budget
Act of 1974 and tried, to little avail, to increase defense funding. However,
increased Soviet threat perception altered this trend.
G. THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION
During the 1970s, the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Congressional
Research Service, and the Central Intelligence Agency published reports
documenting a substantial military advantage for the Soviet Union. These reports
greatly increased public concern for US military preparedness and the US/Soviet
military imbalance [Ref. 13:p. 126]. This concern resulted in increased defense
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dollars in the last years of the Carter administration and then in the Reagan
buildup.
Real defense spending rose each year under Carter, but at a rate of increase
slower than that of non-defense spending. Average real spending for defense was
nearly $195 billion annually for the period FY 1960-1965, while the average for FY
1977-1981 was almost 20 percent lower. Meanwhile, the FY 1981 peak was still
below pre-Vietnam levels [Ref. 13:p. 132-133]. Although Carter may be credited
with a part in reversing the downward trend in defense appropriations, the
budgetary policy of his Presidency was dominated by demands to support
domestic programs.
H. THE REAGAN/BUSH ADMINISTRATIONS
During the Reagan years, defense spending reached unprecedented
peacetime levels. Outlays during the 1984-1989 period ranged from $227 billion
to $300 billion, in current dollars, peaking at 28 percent of the total budget in FY
1987. Also, from FY 1982-1989 defense hovered near six percent of GDP [Ref.
27:Part Five, p. 87]. For the period FY 1981-1985, outlay growth exceeded 90
percent. "Real defense spending under Reagan was roughly equal to peak levels
during the Korean and Vietnam wars" [Ref. 13:p. 135].
As a result of the investments and expenditures during this period, in 1987
according to DoD, the US/Soviet military disparity was eUminated. The Reagan
years are encapsulated in the following quote: "The goal of the Reagan program
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was to boost spending quickly in all defense budget areas and to incorporate high
rates of growth in investment budget authority that would drive the budget in
future years" [Ref. 13:p. 138].
As indicated by the previous discussion of the current defense budget
climate, the Bush presidency essentially aimed to continue the Reagan policy and
philosophy as stated above, but the global events mentioned earlier resulted in
drastic changes to the administration's defense budgets, as indicated in Figure 4.1.
While substantially reducing the dollars available for defense, these changes
purportedly retain a commitment to a strong, capable defense.
I. THE FUTURE OF DEFENSE
The current estimate in the 1993 Historical Tables for defense outlays for
1997 is $289.3 billion or 17.2 percent of total federal outlays and 3.6 percent of
GDP [Ref. 25:Part Five, p. 88]. While the dollar value associated with these
percentages is high, taken within a historical perspective of defense spending,
they represent the lowest levels for defense as both a percentage of total federal
outlays and of GDP since 1948 (Figure 4.3).
Figure 4.4 depicts the relationship between defense outlays and total federal
outlays in current dollars. Obviously, defense outlays have not risen at the same
pace as total federal outlays over the last forty years.
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From this historical tableau, defense spending does not seem to be
inordinately excessive. Yet a massive American military drawdown is underway.
There must be a significant basis for a reversal of such an enormous magnitude.
The next section examines the current defense cutting rationale.
J. THE DEATH OF THE SOVIET UNION AND BIRTH OF THE PEACE
DIVIDEND
First among the reasons for the defense builddown is the disappearance of
the threat from the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. This apparent end
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to Soviet communism has created a belief in the need for an illusive peace
dividend. Initially, the conventional wisdom held that the downsizing of the
American military would produce dollars for immediate use in non-defense areas.
This belief in the peace dividend led to massive efforts to eliminate large portions
of the US military, i.e., base closings, personnel cutbacks, consolidations of
services, and large reductions in the purchase and development of weapons
systems.
No doubt, the end of the Soviet threat necessitated a review of defense
policy and planning, and may even warrant the monumental defense reductions
proposed by some; however, the immediate availability of actual peace dividend
dollars is debatable in part due to the size of the annual budget deficit.
1. Foreign Aid
One consumer of potential peace dividend dollars is the amount of
financial aid diverted to assist the former Soviet Union in its transition to
democracy. In the FY 1993 National Defense Authorization Bill Conference
Report, the House and Senate conferees authorized $800 million for the
demilitarization of the Soviet Union—$150 million higher as a result of a proposal
by Senator Lugar, R-Indiana [Ref. 28:p. 2959]. The authorization is also higher as
a result of Senator Nunn's proposal to increase Soviet Aid by $400 million
[Ref. 22:p. 2954].
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K. BASE REALIGNMENTS AND CLOSURES MEET THE PEACE
DIVIDEND
The peace dividend is rooted in the belief that trimming defense by cutting
and closing bases will result in a net savings of defense dollars that can be
redirected into non-defense financial requirements. This net savings represents an
amount remaining after the cutting and closing bills have been paid. Between
1992-1997, estimated costs to close 47 domestic bases and realign 28 others are
$5.7 billion [Ref. 29:p. 27]. The costs associated with the restructuring of defense
include base shutdown costs and personnel reduction costs.
In reality, base shutdown costs—environmental cleanup, transportation of
personnel and equipment, and the required demilitarization of facilities, to name
a few—are larger than expected. "Department of Defense environmental spending,
much of it going towards the cleanup efforts at base closures," and most of it
funded from O&M, "will grow an estimated three billion dollars in 1991 to $12
billion in 1995" [Ref. 29:p. 21].
Personnel reduction costs—severance pay, discharge administration, and
retraining programs—have also consumed larger amounts of current DoD
appropriations than expected. The 1993 defense appropriations bill included a $2
billion defense conversion fund to, "cushion the impact of Pentagon budget cuts
on defense contractors, their employees and their communities. The Senate, by
voice vote, approved an amendment to add $470 million to the $130 million
already in the bill for transition grants to workers and communities hit hard by
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defense cuts, and also doled out $675 million among ten of the conversion
projects covered by the authorization bill" [Ref. 22:p. 2953].
The shutdown costs mentioned above compare with a total estimated
savings of $6.5 billion from base closure and realignment, or a net savings of $850
million. And, starting in 1998, annual savings are projected at $1.7 billion [Ref.
29:p. 2792].
It is quite possible that the restructuring of the Defense Department may
produce this estimated level of savings, but it is equally likely that the
restructuring may consume more dollars than initially estimated, and result in
what might be termed a "peace penalty."
L. MANDATORY VERSUS DISCRETIONARY SPENDING
A second justification utilized for shifting dollars from defense to non-
defense is rooted in economics—the size of the federal budget deficit and the
national debt. Tied to the widespread effects of a sluggish U.S. economy, it seems
unlikely that the U.S. government can continue to spend at current rates in all
budget areas without raising taxes or increasing the size of the federal deficit. If
government revenues matched spending, defense would probably not be as
vulnerable to cuts.
Because this is not the case, defense susceptibility to cuts is increased,
despite the fact that the actual amount of controllable spending is decreasing as
fast as the deficit is increasing. Although defense outlays as a percentage of total
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federal outlays have been declining, defense outlays as a percentage of
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Furthermore, non-discretionary spending (entitlements and interest on the
national debt) continue to consume a larger share of the budget, approximately
50 percent. Entitlements and interest on the debt are the only two categories of
spending that fail to indicate a future decline [Ref. 30:p. 55].
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reports that in 1991, total
entitlements and other mandatory spending were $636 billion or 11.3 percent of
GDP, and will rise to $977 billion or approximately 12.2 percent of GDP in 1997
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[Ref. 30:p. 56]. According to Office of Management and Budget (OMB), for the
period 1985-1997, mandatory spending will increase by 33 percent, domestic
discretionary spending by eight percent, while defense BA will decrease by 37
percent [Ref. 31:p. 38].
Interest on the national debt in 1991 reached a total of $196.3 billion or 3.5
percent of GDP [Ref. 30:p. 118-119]. According to the CBO, "interest spending,
fueled by the large deficits of the 1980s and 1990s, is more than twice as big, in
relation to GDP, as it was in the late 1970s" [Ref. 30:p. 47]. The CBO estimates that
net interest will total $278 billion in 1997, or 3.5 percent of GDP [Ref. 30:p. 65].
This brings up an important numerical relationship—roughly half of the
total amount of discretionary spending is defense spending. Since Congress
eschews cuts to mandatory entitlement spending in favor of discretionary
spending, there will be increased scrutinizing and paring of discretionary
accounts. Therefore, as the largest single discretionary account, defense spending
will face increasing downward pressure.
M. THE RETURN OF GUNS VERSUS BUTTER-THE END OF BEA 1990
A third reason for the continued reduction of defense dollars, tied to the
issue of controllable spending, is the competition for dollars between defense and
non-defense. This conflict is scheduled to resume in 1993 after the expiration of
provisions of the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990.
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Under BEA, the budget procedure law passed by Congress in the
Reconciliation Act of 1990, multiyear spending caps were placed on defense,
international, and domestic discretionary spending through FY 1993. These caps,
imposed by category, effectively ended the competition for dollars between
categories and sidelined the guns versus butter struggle. In 1994 and 1995, a
single cap will constrain all three categories combined [Ref. 32:p. 6]. This single
cap will again change the complexion of the defense budget by resuming conflict
between guns and butter. Chances are, defense will lose additional dollars.
According to Doyle and McCaffery:
Defense will certainly be the target of further cuts. It remains to be seen how
significant a reduction in defense spending will be acceptable to both
branches of government, how these "savings" are allocated among
competing demands for increased spending for nondefense discretionary
programs, tax cuts, and deficit reduction, and how other BEA spending
control will be altered as part of this adjustment (the single cap) [Ref. 32:p.
7].
The impetus to cut defense will negatively impact DoD ability to efficiently
manage its financial resources. In the next section we examine the impact of
defense cuts on the O&M appropriation and, consequently, on budget flexibility.
N. THE IMPACT OF DEFENSE CUTS ON OPERATIONS AND
MAINTENANCE
This thesis has already analyzed the costs associated with base closures,
specific dollar amounts for environmental clean-up costs, and the fact that
roughly 50 percent of the total federal budget is uncontrollable.
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However, this is not the end of the story. For example, "The financing of the
(environmental) clean-up remains at issue between Congress and DoD. Congress
insists, over DoD objections, that the work be financed by transfers from other
DoD accounts" [Ref. 29:p. 27]. Recalling Les Aspin's affectionate label for O&M
as "the biggest black hole of all in defense" [Ref. 15:p. 1822], we believe his
reference to "other DoD accounts" means the O&M account. And, where will the
dollars come from to meet increased funding needs in other areas, e.g., foreign
aid, the personnel conversion program, etc?
There is at least one answer to this question. A House Armed Services
subcommittee studied the O&M account and concluded that only 25 percent was
directly related to readiness. In its report, the subcommittee stated, "Most O&M
funding goes for things other than training and operating tempo..." (overhead)
"...it is clear that overhead can be reduced without degrading readiness..."
[Ref. 15:p. 1824].
This attitude will cause the O&M account to bear the brunt of further cuts,
especially when considering the drastic cuts already endured by the defense
investment accounts.
O. THE O&M APPROPRIATION
The Operation and Maintenance (O&M) appropriation includes funding for
a myriad of activities. According to the Congressional Research Service's "A
Defense Budget Primer," and as briefly described in the previous chapter, O&M
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includes: "salaries, benefits, and retired pay for most civilian DoD employees;
flying hours; ship operations; training of land forces; real property maintenance;
minor construction; equipment maintenance; fuel; repair parts; supplies; various
personnel, base operating, and administrative support activities; and health care
and Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services
(CHAMPUS)" [Ref. 19:p. 22].
By examining this list, which by no means is comprehensive, one can easily
conclude that the O&M appropriation is extremely large and complex. In fact, the
total defense appropriation for O&M in FY 1993 is $78 billion in budget authority
(BA) representing the largest single defense appropriation title in terms of total
dollars. After O&M, the next largest appropriation, military personnel, is two
billion dollars less. O&M constitutes nearly 30 percent of the defense budget
[Ref. 21:p. 3260-3261].
In terms of current dollars, since 1976, O&M BA has not grown as fast as
total defense BA (Figure 4.6). In addition, O&M has remained a relatively constant
percentage of total DOD BA and total federal BA since 1976. This reinforces our
point that as the overall defense pie shrinks, a relatively constant O&M
appropriation will be more easily targeted for oversight restrictions.
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P. PUMMELLING PROFLIGACY OR PROMOTING EFFICIENCY
One of the current beliefs among defense cutting advocates is that if O&M
is the same percentage of the DoD budget as it was during periods of suspected
budget profligacy, O&M must contain some institutionalized inefficiencies that
can be eliminated. Applying the assumption of at least a "five percent level of
inefficiency and wastage in even well-operated, large and complex public or
private organizations" [Ref. 33:p. 30], there may exist some slack in the O&M
budget. We maintain, however, that a small amount of slack promotes
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organizational efficiency by providing flexibility to deal with emergent requirements
in a timely manner. If O&M represents the only budget area for a commander to
exercise discretion, as our next chapter will document, O&M cuts will therefore
cut flexibility.
Q. O&M—A QUICK AND EASY TARGET
Besides the absolute size of the appropriation, O&M represents an attractive
target for defense cuts based on its outlay rate. As mentioned in Chapter III, in
comparison with procurement and military construction, O&M is a "fast-
spending" account. And, since one major political aspect of the current defense-
cutting rationale is the generation of immediate dollars, cuts are often imposed
on fast-spending accounts.
1. The Effect of Uncertainty
Finally, one potential impact of the elevated threat of fiscal cuts to the
O&M account and on all accounts within DoD is the increased inefficiency
associated with higher levels of operational uncertainty. It is much more difficult
to make optimal decisions in a rapidly changing environment. In "The Pentagon
Squeeze," Jones sums up this effect of the downsizing:
The Rubik's Cube (the downsizing of the armed services as referred to by
General Merrill McPeak, Air Force Chief of Staff)... is continually being
reconfigured, with each move raising disputes that must be negotiated by
OSD. At the same time, budget planners, not to mention officials responsible
for ongoing programs are left in a state of confusion [Ref. 29:p. 27].
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R. CONCLUSION
Current threats to the defense budget have been summarized in this chapter.
These threats are likely to lead to further erosion of the budget flexibility of
installation commanders from the top down by providing the commander with
a reduced O&M budget with which to accomplish the mission.
The chapter presented a historical perspective of the defense budget,
highlighting through both text and illustrative graphs the dynamic surge and
dribble pattern of defense funding and how this pattern poses difficulties for
defense planning and budget execution.
Finally, we suggested the immediate and future impact of defense cuts on
the O&M appropriation—increased congressional scrutiny and further reduction.
To reiterate, there are two underlying themes important to our budget
flexibility argument. First, cuts in the defense budget will equate to lower O&M
appropriations. With lower O&M allocations and a constant or increased number
of higher authority mandates, installation commanders will lose additional budget
execution flexibility. In essence, the commander's flexibility has been locked in a
vise between decreasing top-line budget allocations and increasing spending
restrictions and requirements—both of which are partly resultant from a
congressional desire to exercise tighter control over defense spending.
Second, as a result of increased congressional interest in defense and the
defense builddown, we maintain that the O&M appropriation has become the
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likely target for further reduction. The net result will serve to tighten the vise on
the commander's flexibility.
Chapter V analyzes the O&M appropriation in further detail. Specifically, it
focuses more closely on the flow of funds within the Operations and
Maintenance, Marine Corps (O&MMC) appropriation, and demonstrate why it is
the only remaining source of budget flexibility for Marine Corps installation
commanders.
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V. THE OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE APPROPRIATION
This chapter delves into the one budget area—Operation and
Maintenance—in which a commander has the potential to exercise budgetary
discretion. Here we take one step closer to Marine installations to focus on the
issue of budget flexibility within the O&MMC appropriation. After explaining the
process and flow of dollars from Congress to the Marine Corps installation level,
we will identify specific installation O&MMC spending categories, i.e., the costs
associated with doing business at this level. We then tie the O&MMC
appropriation to the concept of budget execution flexibility. Finally, we identify
the restrictions and requirements within O&MMC, and discuss the impact of
these restrictions and requirements on a commander's flexibility. We begin by
describing the flow of the O&M appropriation from Congress to the installation
level.
A. AUTHORIZATION
Following passage of a budget resolution specifying a ceiling on defense
spending, Congress provides funds for DoD through both authorizing and
appropriating legislation. Authorization precedes appropriation. Federal law
states:
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No Funds may be appropriated for any fiscal year to or for ... or obligated
or expended for.. .operation and maintenance of any armed force or of the
activities and agencies of the Department of Defense.. .unless funds thereof
have been specifically authorized by law (10 USC 114) [Ref. 19:p. 43].
Authorizing bills grant legal authority "to establish and maintain a
Government program or agency" [Ref. 19:p. 42]. The O&M program is contained
within the DoD Authorization Act.
Authorization is followed by the appropriation of budget authority (BA)
which permits the actual obligation and expenditure of government funds.
Referring back to Figure 3.7, O&M has consistently been around 30 percent of
DoD BA and five percent of total federal BA.
1. Appropriations
In general, appropriations are acts of Congress that allow federal
agencies to incur obligations and make payments from the Treasury
[Ref. 34:p. 186]. Appropriations are subdivided into accounts which include
budget-activities and line-items. Once the appropriation act has been signed by
the president, it can be implemented. This implementation occurs when the U.S.
Treasury signs a warrant citing specific appropriation symbols, dollar amounts
and spending restrictions. The warrant is then forwarded to the General
Accounting Office (GAO) for countersignature and verification. Countersignature
permits funds to be apportioned and allocated to the Department of Defense.
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2. Apportionment
The release of funds, or apportionment, "is defined in DODDIR 7200.1
as a 'determination by the director of the OMB as to the amount of obligations
which may be incurred during a specific period under an appropriation pursuant
to 31 U.S. Code 1512'" [Ref. 35:p. 3-25]. Apportionment controls the rate at which
funds are obligated and is intended to generate the most effective and economical
use oi funds at the DoD level. DoD, in turn, allocates funds to the Services.
Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC) provides the documentation
necessary to obtain apportionment of appropriated funds and to establish funding
authorizations in accordance with prescribed procedures of the Comptroller. Upon
receipt of funding from OSD, the Comptroller of the Navy allocates all Marine
Corps appropriations to the Commandant of the Marine Corps within "limitations
established by Congress, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), or by his own office" [Ref. 35:p. 1-25]. HQMC
then allocates funds to subordinate headquarters.
3. Allocations
"Allocations provide a means of establishing responsibility for fund
administration and of ensuring compliance with Congressional intent and Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) constraints in the use of funds for programs
below the appropriation level" [Ref. 35:p. 3-49]. Funding allocations are provided
to O&M appropriation sponsors utilizing Resource Authorization, Navy
Comptroller (NAVCOMPT) form 2168-1.
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The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) is the appropriation
sponsor for the O&MMC appropriation. As such, CMC is charged with
supervisory control over the entire appropriation, and during budget execution,
can recommend the reprogramming of funds from one program to another within
the O&MMC appropriation.
To recap, Congress authorizes funding for executive agency programs,
including DoD, and then appropriates funding through OMB's apportionment
process. The Defense Department, in turn, allocates specific amounts to the
military departments which, in turn, provide suballottments to subordinate units.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the flow of funds from Congress to the Marine Corps
installation level.
Within the O&MMC appropriation, there are specific congressional,
DoD, DoN, and CMC spending directives that are included with the
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Figure 5.1
4. O&MMC at the Installation Level
At the installation level, it is important to examine the breakdown of
funds received by the installation commander. A major Marine Corps command
will first see an initial Operating Budget (OPBUD) from CMC. The OPBUD
contains installation funding authorization broken down by subhead and by
quarter. Subheads are four digit accounting codes used to denote the first level
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subdivision of an appropriation. The first two digits identify the administering
office (AO), which is responsible for subhead accounting, budgeting and
reporting. The last two digits denote the budget activity, an account established
within each appropriation to record financial transactions relating to the specific
functions contained in the budget as approved by the Congress. Within the
O&MMC appropriation, CMC is the AO.
The subheads listed in the OPBUD are 2720 - General Purpose Forces
2770 -General Supply and Maintenance, 2780 - Training, Medical, and other
Personnel Activities, and 2790 - Administration and Associated Activities. We
further itemize the components of these subheads later in the Composition section.
The OPBUD contains a remarks section which specifies spending
directives. These restrictions take the form of spending floors, ceilings, and
targets. Any time that funding changes in relation to the subhead categories
and/or spending directives of the initial OPBUD, the command receives an
updated budget in the form oi an OPBUD amendment.
The OPBUD also identifies the legal liability of the commander. This
liability is stated in a dollar amount to which the commander is held responsible
under 31 U.S. Code 1517. This article of law prohibits "any act which will cause
an obligation or expenditure in excess of the apportioned or reapportionment
made for an appropriation" [Ref. 35:p. 3-45]. Simply stated, spending over
authorized amounts constitutes a Section 1517 violation for which a commander
is legally liable.
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With OPBUD in hand, the commander and his comptroller team begin
to implement their budget-execution strategy.
5. Budget Execution
Budget execution—the obligation and expenditure of funds—is the
third oi four phases of the defense budget process—(1) formulation by the
executive branch, (2) review and approval by Congress (the oversight process),
and (4) Review and Audit [Ref. 19:p. 31]. Normally, budget execution commences
with the start of the fiscal year, October 1, and culminates with the obligation and
expenditure of the last dollar of funds on 30 September of the following year
(close-out). According to the Navy Comptroller Manual (NAVCOMPTMAN,
1988), budget execution is:
that phase of the budget cycle which encompasses all the actions required
to accomplish effectively, efficiently, and economically the programs for
which funds were requested and approved by competent authority. It
overlaps the formulation and review phases and continues throughout the
period of availability of the appropriations for obligation or expenditure.
Effective budget execution requires procedures for control and evaluation
[Ref. 35:p. 3-1].
We now turn to the composition of the installation budget.
B. COMPOSITION OF THE INSTALLATION BUDGET
In this section, we will itemize the types of installation spending included
in each of the previously mentioned subheads. We begin with subhead 2790.
Funding within the 2790 subhead is for administrative purposes. Camp
Pendleton, for example, receives 2790 funding for its Western Area Counsel's
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Office (WACO)—its legal facility. Subhead 2780 is allotted for the following:
specialized skills training, off-duty education, other personnel support, and
training support. Subhead 2770 is strictly for subsistence purchases. And, subhead
2720 is the broadest and most inclusive category of all. It includes the following:
maintenance of real property (MRP), base operations support (BASEOPS), service-
wide activities, and base communications (BASECOM). [Ref. 36]
A typical Marine Corps installation may be examined to relate these
spending categories to actual military activities.
Marine bases and stations exist primarily to support the Marine Corps
operating forces. In brief, the installation can be quite large, in essence, resembling
the equivalent of a small city—with its own population, utilities, police force, etc.
With this in mind, Table 5.1 identifies specific cost categories associated with
operating a typical installation.
These cost categories suggest the scope of the financial challenges facing
today's installation commanders. The commanders are not alone, however. An
examination of an installation's organizational matrix reveals a wealth of
functional departments corresponding to these categories listed in Table 4.1. These
departments are staffed by experts in each functional area, and are designed to
execute installation operations.
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* See Appendix A for explanation.
Source: Camp Pendleton 1993/94 POM Impact Statement
The commander and the installation's functional experts are placed at a
budgetary disadvantage from the onset. With restrictions on spending identified
in the initial OPBUD, the commander begins the year with significant constraints
on execution flexibility.
These constraints, introduced in the next section, can be extremely
frustrating. As discussed in Chapter I, the results of the Unified Budget Test
indicate that a commander facing fewer constraints is more likely to execute a
budget more efficiently. The current number of restrictions in the commander's
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budget create a perpetual struggle to do more with less as a larger portion of each
year's budget is used to meet imposed spending floors, which may be higher than
what is necessary to comply with higher authority intent.
We now turn to a discussion of O&MMC as it relates to flexibility, and
specific budget execution restrictions placed on the Marine installation.
C. O&M AND FLEXIBILITY
Among all appropriations, O&MMC is the only source of true budget
execution flexibility for Marine Corps installation commanders. The commander
receives funds from many other sources, but all other appropriations
(Procurement, Military Construction, Family Housing, etc.) are passed down to
the installation level having already been earmarked or fenced for specific
projects. While the commander has the flexibility, in most cases, of determining
the priority of projects for which to request funds, there is no flexibility in the
execution oi the budget once those funds arrive.
This inflexibility in the use of other appropriations is likely to lead to many
of the inefficiencies discussed in the chapter on flexibility. The funds must be
used for the specific projects for which they were earmarked, and any unused
funds cannot be used for other purposes, but must be returned. This removes an
economic incentive to complete a given project for less than the amount already
earmarked. In addition, returning funds at the end of the year is looked upon
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unfavorably, rather than encouraged. This problem, however, is the subject of
another study. The focus of this thesis is restricted to the O&MMC appropriation.
As stated above, O&MMC is virtually the only source of funding that allows
the installation commander any measure of flexibility. It is the only appropriation
in which the commander may use discretion in determining the most effective
and efficient utilization of funds, once the funds have been received. It is,
therefore, the appropriation that currently provides incentives for efficient
allocation of resources. Unfortunately, even this source of flexibility within the
installation commander's budget has been significantly eroded by the restrictions
placed on funds within the account, and by the growth of fixed costs in the
operation of bases and stations.
D. RESTRICTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS WITHIN O&MMC
In the execution of installation budgets, flexibility has been drastically
diminished in recent years. In addition to decreases due to declining top-line
budgets, flexibility has been reduced from the bottom up in two primary ways:
1) increasing numbers of restrictions placed on how the funds are spent, which
results in tighter competition for scarcer funds; and 2) increases in specific kinds
of required spending, i.e., mandatory programs and rising fixed costs. While some
flexibility erosion falls partly within each category, we will address each category
separately within this section.
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1. Spending Restrictions
One way to think about restrictions is to look at them as fences placed
around certain pools of money. The purpose of these fences is to ensure that the
programs for which each pool of money is provided are fully funded to the extent
to which funds are available. The most notable fences within O&MMC are the
appropriation subheads mentioned earlier.
Once the O&M funds have been funnelled into their separate subheads,
the installation commander loses the flexibility to shift funds from one subhead
to another. The authority to transfer funds between subheads is held at the CMC
level. At best, this segregation of funds provides a measure of protection from
renegade installation commanders with blatant disregard for HQMC intent. At the
worst, the segregation of funds undermines any incentives a commander may
have to execute efficiently within any subhead which has received more funding
than necessary. If excess funds within a subhead will be withdrawn and, most
likelv, removed from the budget base in the following year, the installation
commander is encouraged to find creative (and possibly wasteful) ways to spend
money within its given subhead.
The subheads, however, are not the only sources of restriction on
O&MMC execution. The subheads are further compartmentalized into program
packages at the HQMC level. These program packages are managed by program
sponsors who are watchdogs and advocates for what they consider the proper
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utilization of funds within their programs. The following table may be useful in
conceptualizing the large number of program restrictions currently in existence.
TABLE 5.2. O&MMC DIRECT PROGRAM PACKAGES
Subhead Program Package (PP) PP Code
2720 Base Operations, Other 2BO
Base Operations, MRP (Minor Const) 2BO
Base Operations, MRP (Maint & Rep) 2BO
Audio Visual 2BO
Base Communications 2BC
Service Wide Activities 2SW
2770 Subsistence in Kind (SIK) 7SP
2780 Special Skill Training 8SS
Training Support 8TS
Off Duty Education 80D
Other Personnel Support 80S
2790 Other Administrative 90A
Source: MCB, Camp Pendleton internal document "Program Package Code
Definitions."
The funding received by an installation commander is quite
compartmentalized. To be effective advocates, each program sponsor must see
their program as the most important program in the Marine Corps. Therefore, if
a commander underexecutes in any given area, it will be that much more difficult
to justify funding in the following year, because the sponsor will always get
money to those commanders who demonstrate an ability to spend program funds.
Again, this system runs counter to incentives for efficiency.
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2. Strength of Restrictions
While the fences between subheads are inviolable at the installation
level, some of the program fences are sturdier than others. This occurs because
some program sponsors maintain stronger control over their programs due to
their current political importance. The Other Personnel Support program, for
example, is currently the most powerful program in the Marine Corps because it
contains such politically important quality of life items as child development and
family advocacy. The Service Wide Activities program is similarly powerful
because it contains funding for such must-pay items as environmental
management and Federal Employment Compensation Act (FECA) claims.
Apart from the inviolable fences created by subheads, and the political
power of the programs mentioned above, the firmness of the fences within
subheads can generally be determined from the wording on the OPBUDs. The
funding for flight operations is firmly fenced, and the OPBUD states that it cannot
be spent for other purposes, and should not be exceeded without approval from
higher authority. Similarly, funding for maintenance of real property (MRP) has
a floor for spending and is "not available for other purposes, without prior CMC
approval" [Ref. 36:p. 1]. In the FY 1992 Defense Appropriations Conference
Report, in the section on real property maintenance, it states: "The conferees agree
to establish the Real Property Maintenance, Defense account under the control of
the Comptroller of the Department of Defense" [Ref. 16:p. 51]. This is a step
toward greater centralized control, and away from flexibility.
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While it is easier to get prior approval "for other purposes" within
some programs man within others, all these restrictions diminish the
commander's flexibility until the only place flexibility can be found is within the
2BO Program Package Code categories.
3. Competition for Funds
While O&M is increasingly seen as a source of funding for other uses,
the same is true of the Base Operations, Other category within O&MMC. When
Congress provided in the FY 1990 Defense Authorization Bill for the
establishment of mandatory DoD support of childcare services upon installations,
they determined that the majority of the funding should be provided from the
existing budget base. Consequently, according to the office of the Fiscal Director,
the Marine Corps shifted $7.7 million dollars into childcare from other base
operations accounts for FY 1992. For FY 1993 the transfer is set for $13 million
[Ref. 37]. These dollar amounts seem small within the grand scheme, but every
dollar taken away is a decrease in flexibility for the commander.
A similar situation occurred in FY 1991 when HQMC determined that
environmental management and FECA should be funded at the installation level.
Some additional funds were provided in the installation budget base, but
significant portions of the funding were transfers from other base operations
accounts. By establishing increased spending requirements without commensurate
increases in funding, higher authorities are forcing commanders into a position
of decreased flexibility.
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4. The Latest Assault on Flexibility
The most recent attempt at restriction on the commander is the decision
by DoD that FY 1993 minor construction funds should be transferred into the
Military Construction Appropriation account. Minor construction has traditionally
been a source of tremendous flexibility for the commander because funds can be
rapidly obligated at year end to existing contracts. This allowed the commander
to hold on to funds for contingencies throughout the year, but still execute on
target at the end of the year.
The reason DoD wants the funding to be transferred is that Military
Construction is a slow-spending account compared to O&M. Since Military
Construction outlays can be shifted from the current year to subsequent years,
DoD can effectively avoid current year outlays without having to reduce
requested funding levels in the politically important area of MRP.
As of the FY 1992 House Defense Appropriations bill, Congress had
not approved this action, and they maintained the importance of current year
spending on MRP. The DoD is still pursuing the option of shifting minor
construction funding into the Military Construction Appropriation. If this transfer
becomes reality, this will have the effect of further limiting a commander's
flexibility to the Base Operations, Other category of spending.
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5. Spending Requirements
While the restrictions have diminished flexibility for installation
commanders until it exists only in a small corner of their budget, required
spending is rapidly eating up even that small corner. Within Base Operations, the
commander must pay for a variety of activities. Included in this category is
money which must be spent on the Marine Corps drug program. This is
essentially a fence within a fence, because the spending for this program is
mandatory, and the funding designated for drug reduction cannot be spent for
other purposes.
Similarly, though not as strictly required, is appropriated fund support
for the Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) activity. This support is provided
as a target amount based on the importance which the Marine Corps places on
"quality of life" issues for its Marines. This category of spending has become more
important since a 1991 study by the Morale, Welfare and Recreation branch at
HQMC notified the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) that the Marine
Corps spends fewer dollars per service member on MWR than do the other
services [Ref. 38].
Two other important sources of required spending are environmental
management and FECA. These items are legal liabilities for the installation
commander. Failure to pay certain fines or claims, or to comply with regulations,
could result in criminal charges being filed. While there are funds available within
the 2SW PP Code specifically for these items, if expenses exceed the funds
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provided, the commander has no choice but to pay them from Base Operations.
6. Rising Fixed Costs
The two largest expense items at almost every installation are civilian
labor and utilities, both of which are paid from Base Operations. 1 For any given
budget year, these two categories can be looked upon as fixed costs. This is true
for several reasons.
Civilian labor is largely fixed due to the fact that the rules governing
federal employees and employment make it extremely difficult to release
employees who have gained a permanent status. Even if a position is eliminated,
efforts must be made to find another position for the affected employee.
One of the only ways to significantly reduce the civilian workforce at
any installation is a reduction in force (RTF). This must be approved in advance
by the Secretary of the Navy, and the mandatory transition assistance and
termination allowances can make this an extremely expensive option in the short
term. Also, if a commander fails to execute the full dollar amount specified under
the Manage-to-Payroll (MTP) budget, that commander will likely face a reduction
in this budget for the following year. This provides an incentive to spend all the
funds received for this purpose, even if the mission could be performed with less.
Utilities can be looked on as fixed for a different reason. It is obvious
that there is some minimum level of utility use which is necessary to allow an
. These "fixed costs" actually contain both fixed and variable elements. The usage here conforms to that
observed at the units studied.
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installation and the units residing on it to fulfill their missions. This is one area
in which installation commanders have taken great pains to cut back in recent
years, and most installations are currently at, or near, a "bare bones" level of
utility usage. The only way for most to reduce further in the short term would
be a change or reduction in the mission requirements.
Although we have called these categories fixed, they are really
anything but fixed because of inflation. Civilian pay raises are mandated by
Congress, and much oi the raise for each fiscal year must be absorbed from
existing funds. Likewise, utility costs have been rising drastically in many parts
of the country, which can have a disastrous effect on the installation commander's
budget if the changes were not anticipated when the budget was formulated a
year before execution.
These rising fixed costs have the effect of continuing to eat into a
progressively smaller portion of the pie which is available for reaction to
emerging requirements and for efficient allocation of resources.
7. Conclusion
At this point we picture a nervous sheep grazing in a field that is being
gradually fenced into a smaller and smaller area. At the same time, increasing
portions of the enclosure are being planted with crops which are poisonous for
sheep. Eventually, the sheep will eat its last blade of grass, and either slowly
starve to death or venture over into the poisonous herbs and die quickly.
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The installation commander is in an analogous situation. Soon, required
spending could exceed the funds provided, and the commander will be faced
with difficult decisions. An obvious but painful choice will be to skimp on
mission performance. The alternative is to cross over the legal lines between
funds and risk a Section 1517 violation that could result in criminal prosecution.
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VI. PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA
This chapter presents and analyzes the data obtained during our installation
research. These data, together with the material presented in our earlier chapters,
form the foundation upon which we base our conclusions. First, we will indicate
the sources of data and introduce the reader to the subject installations. Then we
will outline the framework, or algorithm, that we developed for measuring
budget flexibility. Finally, we will present the data and analyze them to support
our premise that budget flexibility at the installation level has, in fact, decreased
significantly over the period of our study.
A. SOURCES OF DATA
As previously indicated, the data collected from the three subject
installations were gleaned from several different sources. Each installation
maintains records differently, thereby making strict comparison of data between
installations problematic. However, consistency from one fiscal year to the next
for each installation has been maintained, allowing analysis of changes in
flexibility at a given installation over time.
The primary sources of budgetary data at all three installations were
operating budgets (OPBUDs), and funding authorization messages. In addition,
Kaneohe Bay and Camp Pendleton data were obtained from report B of the
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Marine Air Ground Financial Accounting Reporting System (MAGFARS) 10890
reports. Each of these sources conveys different types of information, examples
of which are located at Appendix B.
1. Operating Budgets
As introduced in the previous chapter, OPBUDs are usually received
at the installation on a monthly basis, beginning with the initial OPBUD on or
about 1 October of the new fiscal year. Marine Corps installation OPBUDs
originate at HQMC in the Fiscal Division. However, as we will see shortly, some
installations have an intermediary level of command between themselves and
HQMC, so they receive Sub-OPBUDs from their parent organizations.
OPBUDs indicate the current levels of funding, broken down by
subhead and fiscal quarter. In addition, OPBUDs highlight changes in the funding
level which have occurred since the issuance of the prior OPBUD. Perhaps the
most important portion oi the OPBUD is the remarks section that identifies
current fencing (ceilings or floors) for certain budget programs within subheads,
e.g., MRP, DoD Drug Program, etc. Whether it be the initial OPBUD, or a
monthly amendment, this is the installation commander's primary encounter with
budget control from above.
2. Funding Authorization Messages
For the most part, funding authorization messages originate at the next
level of budget hierarchy above the installation. These messages are sent
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whenever there is a change in the level of funding authorization for the
installation, and are summarized in the monthly OPBUDs. They inform the
installation commander of increases or decreases in funding authorization for the
year, and also specify the funding category, or pool, in which the money should
be spent. #
Almost all funding passed down through the authorization messages
is earmarked for a specific use. These uses range from maintenance and
construction projects, to items of equipment, to travel or tuition expenses for
specifically named individuals. Although the provision of these funds precludes
the commander from having to use other funds for necessary items, there is no
flexibility resident in the majority of funding which is provided through the
funding authorization messages. If the funds cannot be used for the purpose
specified in the message, they usually must be returned, unless another high
priority item within the same funding category can be identified.
The funding messages, then, are another way of identifying fencing
within the total dollar amount of funding available to the installation commander.
3. 10890 Reports
The 10890 reports were monthly accounting reports that provided a
great variety of information. Of specific usefulness for our research is the end-of-
year report B, which detailed the actual dollar amounts executed at each
installation. Execution is broken down in several different ways, e.g., expense
elements, program packages, fund administrators, etc. From these reports, it is
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possible to determine exact amounts spent on such things as utilities, labor, MRP,
and any other item ot interest.
Although the 10890s are no longer in use because of the recent
transition to the Standardized Accounting and Budgeting Reporting System
(SABRS), many budget personnel we interviewed would like to have parts of
them back. Much of the information they provided is no longer easily accessible
through SABRS. For this reason, data obtained from FY 1992 and beyond may not
be completely comparable to the data gathered for this study.
B. THE INSTALLATIONS
What follows is a brief review of how each subject installation is unique,
include funding and available data sources.
1. Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, California
Located in Orange County, California, MCAS, El Toro is home to the
Third Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW). El Toro, like Camp Pendleton, is subject to
the high cost of living and extremely stringent environmental regulations of
Southern California. It is also similar to Kaneohe Bay in that it obtains its funding
through an intermediary command, vice directly from HQMC.
El Toro is one of four air stations under the administrative control of
Commander, Marine Corps Air Bases, Western Area (COMCABWEST), co-located
on MCAS, El Toro. This added level in the budget hierarchy is yet another source
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of restriction on budget execution, albeit a minor one compared to HQMC and
Congress.
In terms of data availability, El Toro was unique among the three
subject installations. Report B of the 10890 was unavailable for any fiscal year.
Consequently, we were unable to derive a figure for purchased services
comparable to those derived for the other installations. Also, data concerning the
"other fenced" category for FY 1988 was unavailable. Although we were able to
generate an approximation of the FY 1988 "other fenced" category through linear
regression, a completely accurate analysis of the data for El Toro consists of only
FY 1989 through 1992. Apart from these limitations, it was apparent that El Toro's
record keeping was quite thorough and reliable. The comptroller department also
maintained a large amount of internal analyses, some of which were quite useful
for assisting with our analysis.
As with the other two installations, the cooperation provided was
substantial. We have no apprehensions concerning incomplete or erroneous data
among the data which were available.
2. Marine Corps Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii
Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii is home of the First Marine Expeditionary
Brigade (MEB). Like Southern California, the island of Oahu is characterized by
a relatively high cost of living, and an active public and legislative concern for the
environment. Uniquely among the subject installations, the island location also
generates higher relocation expenses and higher travel related expenses. In
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addition, portions of the air station occupy a former Hawaiian burial ground,
wildlife refuges, and pacific coastline beaches, all of which must be maintained
and protected. Various archeological surveys and environmental impact studies
are frequently necessary throughout the installation.
Like El Toro, Kaneohe Bay is subject to receiving its funding from an
intermediary source. Administratively, the installation falls under the
Commander, Marine Corps Bases and Stations Pacific, located at MCB, Camp
Smith, Hawaii. An comparison of the Sub-OPBUDs for El Toro and Kaneohe Bay
seem to indicate that the fencing generated at Camp Smith is less pervasive than
that generated by COMCABWEST.
The data gathered for Kaneohe Bay were the most complete and
consistent across the entire span of our study—FY 1988 to FY 1992. The 10890s
and Sub-OPBUDs were easily accessible and contained no time-period gaps. The
10890s allowed us to derive a complete picture of the fixed costs, and the funding
authorization messages were clear as to the fences imposed for any given fiscal
year.
3. Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California
Camp Pendleton, home of the First Marine Division and the First Force
Service Support Group (FSSG), is one of the largest bases in the Marine Corps,
both in geography and in population. This distinction serves to offer both the
advantages of economy of scale and the disadvantages of massive size. Its
location in drought-ridden, smog-filled Southern California provides it with
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sizeable firefighting and environmental responsibilities. Like Kaneohe Bay, which
is also home to several wildlife refuges, numerous endangered species, and over
twenty miles of sandy beaches, Camp Pendleton is constantly under
environmental scrutiny. Additionally, recreational beach access, geographic
dispersion of facilities and units, and the fact that Camp Pendleton's roadways
serve as alternative routes for military and civilian traffic when Interstate Route
5 is occasionally closed, place a heavy burden on the infrastructure.
Alone among the subject installations, Camp Pendleton receives its
funding directly from HQMC. As previously indicated, this means they are not
subject to additional fences imposed by an intermediate level of command. Also,
due in part to its size, Camp Pendleton's annual operating budget is much larger
than those of either El Toro or Kaneohe Bay.
Like Kaneohe Bay, we were able to obtain full data sets for Camp
Pendleton for FY 1988. This enables us to perform analysis on five full years of
data, with no gaps in our information.
C. FENCED, FIXED AND FLEXIBLE
As indicated throughout this thesis, one of the primary sources of decreasing
budget flexibility is the increase in required spending. As identified in the last
chapter, required spending takes on the form of both fenced funding and fixed
costs. We have developed an algorithm for measuring the flexibility resident
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within any installation budget which takes into account both shrinking budget
resources, and increasing required spending. The algorithm is as follows:
Flexibility = 2720 Direct Budget Authority - (Fenced Funds + Fixed Costs)
1. 2720 Direct Budget Authority
As related earlier, subheads 2770, 2780 and 2790 are not considered in
the flexibility algorithm because all these funds have been solidly fenced off for
specific purposes. Likewise, indirect funding in the form of unfunded
reimbursables is not included because these funds are also earmarked for specific
purposes. In addition, we only include that portion of MRP funding which is
allocated at the beginning of the fiscal year, because subsequent allocations are
all identified with specific projects, and are determined by service-wide priorities,
rather than installation priorities. We have also attempted to remove all funding
designated for Desert Shield/Desert Storm (DS) expenses. This was easily
accomplished for El Toro, but was not quite as clear-cut for Kaneohe Bay and
Camp Pendleton. Finally, we eliminated Flight Operations funding for the air
stations for all four years because of its conversion to unfunded reimbursable
status in FY 1991.
With these caveats, the 2720 Direct Budget Authority is the funding
which has been allotted to the commander for the operation of the installation.
This is where flexibility resides. Restrictions within this category, i.e., fenced
funds and fixed costs, reduce this flexibility.
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2. Fenced Funds
Fenced funds are those which have been earmarked for specific projects
or programs within the funding authorization messages. Portions of initial
funding authorizations are fenced, but the vast majority of all funding increases
received during the year fall into this category. The earmarks can be for such
things as FECA, environmental management, the DoD drug program, child care
(prior to its transfer into 2780 in FY 1992), Personnel Support Equipment (PSE),
Food Processing and Serving Equipment (FP&SE), etc. In our presentation of the
data below, the "Other Fenced" category includes funding which was earmarked
for specific uses, but does not fit within one of the major fenced categories listed.
It should be noted that some of these fenced categories can also be considered
fixed costs.
3. Fixed Costs
The fixed costs of utilities and civilian labor were described in the last
chapter. In addition, we include non-MRP service contracts, such as the messhall
contract and other purchased services. These contracts are fixed in that most are
annual contracts at a minimum, and they are necessary to the basic operation of
the installation, assuming there is no reduction in assigned mission. As a recap,
we classify these expenses as fixed because there is very little a commander can
do to reduce them in the short term without taking drastic action which may have
long term detrimental effects.
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4. Flexibility
What is left after reducing the total direct 2720 funds available, and
then fencing off large portions for specific purposes and subtracting the large
fixed costs, is the flexible budget. It should be remembered that this flexible sum
is used to pay for all the supplies and materials which are necessary for the
operation of the installation. In addition, if requirements emerge for larger
expenditures in any of the fenced areas, the difference will have to be made up
from the flexible portion of funding.
5. Presentation and Analysis of the Data
With the flexibility algorithm explained, we will now present the data
for each of the subject installations. As stated in our introduction, this study
covers fiscal years 1988 to 1992.
It must be reiterated that the 10890 reports were discontinued at the
close of FY 1991. Since we depended heavily upon these reports for Kaneohe Bay
and Camp Pendleton between FY 1988 and 1991, data for FY 1992 may not be
completely comparable. Our research allowed us to approximate very nearly the
same results using the available reports. The problem did not exist for El Toro
since we did not utilize 10890 reports for that installation.
Unless stated otherwise, all dollar amounts are the actual figures
obtained from the source documents, converted to constant 1988 dollars. The
composite GNP deflators used to convert current dollars to constant dollars are
those obtained from the OMB Historical Tables for 1992. [Ref. 27:p. 17]. Since
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those tables were in constant 1982 dollars, the deflators were converted to reflect
constant 1988 dollars. Percentages given are of 2720 Direct Budget column totals.
Immediately following the presentation of the data for each installation,
we will analyze the data for that installation. Following the analysis of the last
installation, we will provide a summary analysis to tie all the installations
together.
6. Data for MCAS, El Toro
TABLE 6.1. FISCAL YEAR 1988
2720 Direct Budget 45,975,700
Less Fenced
MRP Floor 12,347,499










Note 1: Data for FY 1988 were insufficient to determine the Other Fenced category. This number
is an estimate obtained through linear regression of the Other Fenced category for subsequent
vears.
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TABLE 6.3. FISCAL YEAR 1990






















DoD Drug Prog. 147,942



















DoD Drug Prog. 59,596













Child Development Center transferred to Subhead 2780 in FY 1992.
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7. Analysis for MCAS, El Toro
Of the three installations, El Toro provides the most definitive support
for the premises of our thesis. As is clearly evident in examining the 2720 Direct
Budget line for each fiscal year, the top-line budget in real terms has declined in
every year from FY 1988 to 1991. Although there was a sizeable increase in FY
1992, it is too early to tell whether this is a contradiction of our position or merely
an anomaly. It is possible that the budget was increased to accommodate the
tremendous increase in environmental management costs.
Likewise, Tables 6.1 through 6.4 show that bottom-line flexibility, as
computed using our flexibility algorithm, has decreased both in constant dollars
and in percentages of the total top line for each of the years from FY 1988 to 1991.
There is a slight upturn in real dollars of flexibility for FY 1992, but the actual
percentage of flexibility continues to decline. The degeneration of budget
flexibility for El Toro is presented in Figures 6.1 and 6.2.
As mentioned before, the funds fenced for both FECA and
Environmental Management showed large increases over the previous year. The
huge jumps in fencing for these two categories more than offset the decreases in
the DoD Drug Program and the Child Development Center (CDC). It should also
be noted that the 2720 budget base was decreased in FY 1992 when the CDC
funding was transferred to Subhead 2780. The fence around these funds was
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Figure 6.1
eliminated as one might assume from review of Table 6.5.
Turning to examine the fixed costs for FY 1992, both Non-MRP Labor
and Utilities were increased over the previous year (Utilities to the highest
constant dollar level seen in the period of the study). Again, these large increases
more than offset the minor decrease in Messhall Contracts.
An important point to remember is that flexibility as a percentage of
the total budget is exhibiting a steady decline over the entire period of our study.











percent level present in FY 1988 may have indicated excessive funding in some
areas, but the 3.81 percent flexibility in FY 1992 cannot continue if the desired
outcome of efficient allocations of resources is to be achieved.
Another important point when considering the data for El Toro is that,
although labor costs have remained fairly constant in real terms over the last five
years, the workforce at El Toro has shrunk from 746 employees in FY 1988 to 657
in FY 1992. This relationship is visible in Figure 6.3. The decrease in employees
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Figure 6.3
Also, there are even fewer civilian billets available for base operations
than is indicated by the top-line figure of 657. This is because seven mandatory,
appropriated fund child-care billets were created in 1992, which are included
within the total of 657. Since the dollar figures for labor only reflect 2720 funds,
the cost per base operations employee is increased even more.
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It seems clear from the data that MCAS, El Toro has been facing vastly
diminished budget flexibility over the period FY 1988 to 1992, with the trend
likelv to continue. As alluded to in the section above on flexibility, there are
legitimate budget needs that must be covered through flexibility. For this reason,
the true budget flexibility picture for the installation commander is even bleaker
than what we have presented.
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8. Data for MCAS, Kaneohe Bay
Let us now examine the situation at MCAS, Kaneohe Bay. The data for
Kaneohe Bay are not as unequivocal as those for El Toro. However, they support
the premise of decreasing top-line budgets and increasing required spending.
TABLE 6.6. FISCAL YEAR 1988























































TABLE 6.9. FISCAL YEAR 1991





DoD Drug Prog. 26,743














TABLE 6.10. FISCAL YEAR 1992





DoD Drug Prog. 36,562













1 Child Development Center transferred to Subhead 2780 in FY 1992.
2 Messhall contract discontinued for third and fourth quarters of FY 1992 due to insufficient
funding.
9. Analysis of Data for MCAS, Kaneohe Bay
Although there is fluctuation in the 2720 Direct Budget amounts, the
unmistakable trend is a decrease in top-line budgets. This trend would be much
clearer if FY 1991 could be removed from the analysis. This, of course, is not
possible, but it should be noted that some Desert Shield/ Desert Storm (DS)
funding may still be included in the total for 1991. We attempted to remove this
funding from the data for all three installations, but the designation of DS
expenses was not as clear-cut for Kaneohe Bay and Camp Pendleton as it was for
El Toro.
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Nonetheless, Figure 6.4 illustrates that despite the fluctuation in 2720
direct funding, there has been closure between the top-line budget and required
spending. This closure has resulted in the downward trend for total flexibility
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Figure 6.4
In addition, by studying Tables 6.6 through 6.9, it is evident that
flexibility as a percentage of top-line budget has been following a distinctive












As with El Toro, the civilian labor force has been reduced from a FY
1988-1991 average of 344 to 325 in FY 1992. This occurred over a five year period
when total base operations labor costs (including MRP) decreased by only six
percent in real terms, and grew by approximately 12 percent in current dollars.
Again, 11 of those 325 billets are new child care billets, so the actual labor force
available for base operations has shrunk considerably within the last year. The
total labor costs in current dollars and their respective employment levels are
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Figure 6.6
Despite the fact that the data from Kaneohe Bay do not support our
position as distinctly as the data from El Toro, the trends sustain our assertion
that budget flexibility is, in fact, decreasing at that installation as well.
10. Data for MCB, Camp Pendleton
The final installation we studied was MCB, Camp Pendleton. Camp
Pendleton lies somewhere in between El Toro and Kaneohe Bay in terms of the
support it provides for our thesis.
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TABLE 6.15. FISCAL YEAR 1992





DoD Drug Prog. 458,344













1 Child Development Center transferred to Subhead 2780 in FY 1992.
11. Analysis for MCB, Camp Pendleton
For Camp Pendleton, the 2720 Direct Budget is clearly in real decline
for the entire period from FY 1988 to 1992, as shown in Figure 6.7. The slight rise
in FY 1991 could be due to the fact that the 2720 figure for Camp Pendleton, like
Kaneohe Bay, may still contain some undiscovered DS funds. Be that as it may,
the downward trend continues in FY 1992. Overall, Camp Pendleton 2720 funding
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Figure 6.7
The fluctuation in total required spending for Camp Pendleton, also
exhibited in Figure 6.7, is somewhat deceptive. The sharp drop in both MRP and
Utilities between FY 1988 and FY 1989 reflects the fact that this was a period of
consolidation and reduction for Camp Pendleton. Several small units were
combined, and the Seventh Marine Regiment moved out to the Marine Corps Air
Ground Combat Center in Twentynine Palms, California.
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In addition, the base operations civilian workforce was reduced by
almost 15 percent between FY 1988 and 1992—from 1566 to 1339 (this reduction
includes the establishment of 21 child care billets). The majority of this reduction
was the result of a penalty imposed by HQMC for failing to conduct a directed
commercial activities study. Finally, in FY 1992 Camp Pendleton actually found
a way to increase its own flexibility by obtaining reimbursement from tenant
organizations for utilities and other base services. In fact, the reimbursements for
utilities in 1992 totaled $3,253,626 in constant FY 1988 dollars. If these
reimbursements had not been obtained, total flexibility for FY 1992 would have
been reduced to $1,000,503 or 1.29 percent of the top-line budget.
Considering the above influences, the data obtained from Camp
Pendleton are not incongruous with the premise of decreasing budget flexibility.
Figure 6.8 indicates that total flexibility was steadily decreasing prior to FY 1992.
It would have continued to decline had it not been for the initiative of the
Commanding General and his staff in making a concerted effort to maximize
reimbursement for all support services provided to tenants. What cannot be
overlooked, however, is that the increased flexibility generated through the use
of reimbursibles is temporary. Once a portion of services has been identified as
generating reimbursable funds, the direct funding for that portion will be











Overall, the trends at Camp Pendleton support the thesis of decreasing
funding and increased requirements. Although the evidence is not as readily
apparent from the graphic analysis presented above, after considering the
underlying factors that have influenced the 2720 funding category, it becomes
discernable.
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D. THE FINAL ANALYSIS
1. Total Fenced
It is obvious from the data that the number of fencing categories at the
installation level has grown tremendously between FY 1988 and FY 1992. A closer
look shows that for all three installations, the non-MRP fencing of funds
experienced a dramatic real increase over the period of the study. For both El
Toro and Kaneohe Bay, the increase was also evident in the Total Fenced
category. Camp Pendleton is the only installation which does not exhibit this
phenomenon, but its MRP floor was drastically reduced after FY 1988 as stated
above. For Camp Pendleton there was a constant real increase in the Total Fenced
category from FY 1989 to 1992.
2. Total Fixed
Not as evident as the rise in Total Fenced funds is the trend in the
Total Fixed category. In the constant dollar analysis above, only El Toro showed
an increase in Total Fixed costs between FY 1988 and 1992. However, both El Toro
and Kaneohe Bay showed large increases in current dollar fixed costs—23.44
percent for El Toro and 10.29 percent for Kaneohe Bay. The small decline of 3.34
percent for Camp Pendleton may be entirely accounted for by the savings in
utilities mentioned in the discussion of the data for Camp Pendleton.
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3. Required Spending Versus 2720 Funding
In examining the total required spending (Total Fenced plus Total
Fixed) versus total 2720 funding, the current dollar analysis is even more dramatic
than the constant dollar analysis previously presented. El Toro saw an increase
in total required spending of 53.48 percent over the period FY 1988-1992. Over the
same period, total 2720 funding increased by only 32.54 percent. At Kaneohe Bay,
the increase in total required spending for the FY 1988-1992 period was 18.52
percent, while 2720 funding increased by only 5.52 percent. Finally, Camp
Pendleton's current dollar growth in required spending was closest to its 2720
funding increase. Required spending grew by 3.5 percent from FY 1988 to 1992,
while 2720 funding went up by 3.4 percent. Again, as indicated in the analysis of
Camp Pendleton, there are many underlying reasons to explain the narrow gap.
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Whether measured in current or constant dollars, there is substantial
evidence to support the thesis of decreasing budget flexibility for installation
commanders among the subject installations.
The constant dollar analysis exhibits the real decline in budget resources,
coupled with a general real increase in required spending. The current dollar
analysis clearly shows the nominal decrease in budget flexibility over the period
FY 1988 to 1992.
The following chapters will discuss the impact of decreasing budget
flexibility, recommendations for dealing with and possible solutions to the
problem, and our conclusions about the study and its results.
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VII. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DECREASED BUDGET FLEXIBILITY
The quantitative analysis of 2720 direct funding presented in the previous
chapter identified a generally downward trend in budget flexibility and an
irrefutably low level of flexibility as measured in both actual dollars and as a
percentage of total 2720 direct funding. In this chapter, we supplement these
findings with a qualitative cataloging and discussion of the impact of this reduced
flexibility—both theoretical and actual. In our evaluation of this impact, we
concentrate on the impact of reduced budget flexibility without regard to the
source or cause.
We will first identify the theoretically expected impact of an overly
controlled (inflexible) budget by presenting the published findings of various
budgetary research. Following this, we will present specific instances of the
documented impact of reduced flexibility on the commander, the installations
studied, and the Marine Corps in general. Our impact assessment will also
include an extrapolation of our findings to present what we term the projected
impact—those second-order impacts that result from attempts to combat
decreasing budget flexibility.
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A. THE THEORETICAL IMPACT OF LOW-FLEXIBILITY BUDGETS
In exploring the literature on budgetary control, we found that an
organization's entire budget process, or budget control system plays a major role
in determining that organization's destiny. The budget control system, a far
reaching influence throughout the entire organizational spectrum, can be
considered multi-dimensional. One critical dimension is that of motivation.
1. Motivation
As outlined in Chapter II, if properly established, a budget can support
a financially healthy unit and can motivate individuals within the organization
towards common goals and optimum performance. According to Kamin and
Ronen:
The budget, ...the skeleton of the control system, reflects the organization's
goals and is therefore used as both a yardstick for future planning and a
performance standard.... A successful budgetary system also motivates
managers by conveying expectations of superiors... [Ref. 3:p. 471]. (Emphasis
Added.)
We claim that one major negative impact of the existing inflexible budget
control system is the reduction of motivation. The consequences of reduced
motivation include a negative attitude towards the budget process, suboptimum
performance of both the individual and the unit, and a resultant inefficient
allocation of resources within the DoD.
Consider the impact on the installation commander, a Colonel or above, who
has received extensive training, education, and experience in the "rise to the top."
Once at the top however, the commander is burdened with the responsibility of
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the entire unit but is empowered with only a small fraction of the financial assets
available to accomplish the mission. We presented this situation in Chapter V
when we referred to the frustration felt by the commander at the outset of the
fiscal year when saddled with a budget riddled with numerous constraints. When
provided with seemingly inadequate resources to accomplish the mission, an
organizational leader would also probably question the amount of trust and
confidence bestowed by higher headquarters.
It follows, then, that the commander's motivation to optimize uncontrollable
situations would be negatively affected. The important motivational role played
by the budget system cannot be overlooked. Otley highlights a budget's
motivational role as "central to the effective functioning of a budget system"
[Ref. 39:p. 25], and we agree. We now examine the findings on the level of control
within a budgetary system and how this level interacts with motivation.
Kamin and Ronen assert that top management uses the budget as an
uncertainty reduction mechanism with varying degrees of structure. A less
structured budget provides a range of preferences while a more structured budget
imposes finite numbers [Ref. 3:p. 471]. These authors further state:
In using budgets to filter uncertainty, top management must maintain a
delicate balance, since the more structured budget decreases the flexibility needed
to motivate subordinates, while the less structured budget might be too
ambiguous to motivate subordinates toward goal congruence. A budgetary
system can be dysfunctional when it does not motivate goal congruence [Ref.
3:p. 472]. (Emphasis added.)
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Faced with an inflexible, highly structured budget system, military
installation commanders face exceptional challenges. With higher headquarters
identifying precise goals without providing adequate resources for the unique
goals of the local commander, the resulting incongruence spawns a decreased
motivation to support the budget system. We now turn to an examination of
budgetary slack as one symptom of a dysfunctional, overly controlled, inflexible,
budget system.
2. Budgetary Slack
Combining the works of Kamin and Ronen with Onsi, we define
budgetary, or organizational, slack as "allocations of resources in excess of what
is necessary to maintain the organization" [Ref. 3:p. 472] which "arises from
imperfections in the organizational process of resource allocation" [Ref. 40:p. 535].
According to Merchant, "Onsi found a positive relationship between manager's
needs to create budgetary slack and what he called 'an authoritarian top
management budgetary control system'" [Ref. 41:p. 202]. The high level of fencing
present in installation budgets is indicative of the authoritarian and overly
controlled budget environment currently faced by installation commanders.
Merchant goes on to say that, "the amount of slack in an organization varies
with the business cycle; it is built up during boom times and used as a stabilizing
influence in down periods" [Ref. 41:p. 201]. As presented in Chapter III, during
the late 1970s and most of the 1980s, DoD experienced the "boom times" of the
Carter/Reagan build up, and is now experiencing one of the most profound
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"down periods" in its history. The authoritarian budgetary system, coupled with
the boom and bust DoD "business cycle", has resulted in a certain amount of slack
in installation budgets. Further, the presence of some remaining slack in the O&M
accounts may be evidenced by the fact that O&M appropriations have not
decreased as rapidly as other major DoD accounts during the current drawdown.
However, the existence of budgetary slack is not necessarily bad. Merchant
cites various authors who have noted "that slack can be used to absorb
uncertainty; it provides freedom from short-term commitment that can be useful
in dealing with a lack of predictability" [Ref. 41:p. 203]. Onsi notes that the value
of slack "depends on the manner of its utilization, since it provides a source of
funds that may not otherwise be available or approved because of scarcity of
resources" [Ref. 40:p. 535].
In addition to helping the commander cope with uncertainty, slack enhances
flexibility by "providing a pool of emergency resources" for emerging
requirements. With the low amounts of flexibility as documented in Chapter VI,
any slack resident in installation budgets provides a significant increase in
flexibility. And, as argued in Chapter II, greater flexibility is vital to efficient
allocation of resources at the installation level. For this reason, attempts to
minimize slack in DoD budgets are counterproductive. The combination of
increasing budgetary restrictions and the attack on budget slack promotes a
"whatever it takes" attitude among those battling for scarce resources. This
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attitude, and the need to accomplish the mission, can push individuals into
budgetary gamesmanship and misrepresentation.
3. Gamesmanship
Since financial resources are limited, there will always exist some
degree of budgetary gameplaying. It is our contention that scarcity of resources
and decreasing flexibility result in increased gameplaying at all levels in the DoD
budget hierarchy. Gameplaying can be defined as a commander's strategy for
manipulating the budget system to gain maximum access to available resources.
Gameplaying comes in many forms, both simple and devious. Ironically,
gameplaying has the potential to reduce flexibility even below the initial level of
flexibility that inspired it. Regardless of the type of game, commanders caught in
the act will always suffer a loss of credibility. This reputational blemish may yield
the additional effect of undermining a commander's ability to gain resources for
legitimate needs. Some examples of gameplaying which we will discuss include
brinkmanship, padding the budget, spending up to the allocation limit,
underground operations, and counterbudget systems.
Brinkmanship may involve commanders in "gold watch" tactics in order
to avoid severe budget cuts. In other words, commanders make claims that
projected funding levels are inadequate to permit the continuation of a program
of known importance to higher headquarters. With this threat of terminating such
a program, commanders hope to procure funding for other, lower priority
programs which were not placed on the proverbial chopping block.
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Another prevalent game is padding the budget. This occurs when
commanders know from past experience or future expectations that a certain
percentage of every budget request will be cut or denied by higher headquarters.
Consequently, the budget submission will be formulated to offset this expected
reduction. Another, more innocent form of padding, is incrementalism. This
inefficient approach to budgeting frequently ignores possible savings due to
innovation or re-engineering and simply adds an arbitrary percentage onto the
prior year's budget base.
In discussing the budget base, one cannot ignore the phenomenon of
spending up to the allocation limit. This game involves the commander's effort
to maintain a budget base by spending every dollar authorized whether the
expenditure is necessary or not. The pressures to obligate 100 percent of available
funds are numerous. First, failure to execute the budget as planned reflects
negatively upon the commander's managerial skills. Second, any unobligated
funds will not only be recouped but in all probability will be removed from the
budget base for the subsequent year. Third, he who spends the fastest is the first
to receive remaining unobligated funds of contemporary commanders, or any
surplus in the reserve of the next highest budget echelon, as that echelon itself
attempts to avoid underexecution. This so called "spending for the sake of
spending" will rarely, if ever, result in the efficient allocation of resources.
Another potential budget game may be termed Underground
Operations. This is a game in which a commander manipulates the accounting
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system to hide a necessary or desired project within a perhaps inappropriate
funding category. If this is done, funding will be diverted to a project that would
not otherwise receive sufficient funding within the proper category. This game
may involve a violation of the law, and if so, this represents the poisonous herbs
alluded to at the close of Chapter V. If the pressure of decreasing flexibility is
great enough, some commanders may see no other alternative.
The final game considered here is the Counterbudget Systems game. As
Burrowes and Harvey assert, one consequence of decreasing budget flexibility "is
the use of evasive tactics requiring a greater number of information-gathering and
control systems. This in turn tends to create counter-groups" [Ref. 42:p. 12].
Essentially, commanders must gather together large staffs devoted to generating
effective justification for the programs and projects for which they desire funding.
Not only does this tie up valuable resources, but it virtually ensures that the
commander with the most prolific and eloquent justification staff will obtain a
larger share of the budget pie than the commander who either doesn't play the
game, or has a smaller, less-effective staff.
While the section above outlines some consequences that result from
decreased budget flexibility, the next section presents the actual, documented
impact discovered through our research.
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B. DOCUMENTED IMPACT OF DECREASED FLEXIBILITY
This section presents several actual events that substantiate our contention
that commanders do not possess adequate flexibility to operate their installations.
The information introduced here has been obtained from interviews with
installation commanders and comptrollers. We also introduce material selected
from other impact-related financial correspondence.
1. The Civilian Labor Problem
One of the largest single spending categories for any installation
commander is civilian labor. This is also the source of some major flexibility
problems. Much of the problem which has developed in the area of civilian labor
can be summarized in the following quote from a Commanding General,
COMCABWEST white paper to the Fiscal Director of the Marine Corps.
COMCABWEST's 'top line' funding has increased just 2.3% from FY-89 to
FY-92 ($72.6M to $74.3M). Yet, during the corresponding period, the cost of
the direct-fund civilian work force that is 2.4% smaller (1041 today versus
1067 in '89) has risen 22% ($39.3M versus $32.2M). Further, included in our
smaller FY-92 work force are 24 mandatory-inserted Child Development
Center billets for which the cost of 21 had to be absorbed from existing
Material and Services dollars (about $.7M). As a percent of total O&MMC
funds available in the Command's budget base, the civilian work force has
risen from 44% in FY-89 to 53% today [Ref. 43].
While civilian labor costs have grown to over 50 percent of the O&MMC budget
at many installations, the portion of the budget available for the materials and
services (M&S) necessary to enable those civilian employees to work has
decreased significantly—from 56 percent in FY 1989 to 47 percent in FY 1992 for
COMCABWEST [Ref. 43]. In other words, the expensive civilian work force in
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general is made less efficient by having fewer materials at hand to perform its
mission. This situation is what Don Angel, Comptroller at COMCABWEST, refers
to as the "Civilian Work Force/Materials and Services Inversion" [Ref. 44].
Another impact in the area of civilian labor is that commanders are
increasingly likely to allow civilian billets to lapse. As the costs grow, civilians
who retire or transfer are not immediately replaced. This is one way in which
commanders can save money, but the mission which was performed by personnel
in those billets does not disappear. The commander simply chooses to delay
performance of the mission or pass the burden on to remaining employees or
military personnel. As Colonel R. R. Crawford, Commanding Officer of Kaneohe
Bay puts it, "Commanders will lose flexibility, responsiveness, and timeliness with
less civilian workforce, which most likely will significantly increase the cost of
operating USMC installations" [Ref. 45].
A discussion of the civilian labor problems must address the issue of under-
execution of civilian payroll. The current Manage to Payroll (MTP) system
involves an annual Letter of Authorization (LOA) which sets forth ceilings and
floors on the amount of money which can be expended on civilian payroll, as well
as the end-strength of the installation work force. Despite the fact that no one at
any oi the subject installations could explain how the figures on the LOA were
derived, nor what relationship they bore to the actual figures for civilian payroll,
they are still considered to be relatively binding. Under-execution means that
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civilian labor funds will be withdrawn from the budget base in the subsequent
year.
A commander who makes the hard choices to generate some added
flexibility during a given year may be penalized in the following year. Even
worse, as suggested in Chapter II, a new commander can be penalized for the
actions of a previous commander. Unfortunately, this is not the only significant
problem resulting from decreased flexibility.
2. Service Contracts
One area closely related to the civilian labor problem is the purchase
of commercial services. Due to decreasing work forces and stable or increasing
mission requirements, installations must increasingly purchase services from the
private sector. For Camp Pendleton, the purchase of services increased from
approximately $28 million to just under $40 million dollars between FY 1988 and
FY 1991 [Ref. 46]. This increase of 42 percent occurred during a period when the
total O&MMC funding for Camp Pendleton only increased by 15.21 percent
[Ref. 46].
While the purchase of services is increasing, this is not likely to be the
most efficient allocation of available resources. Various federal contracting
regulations, some designed to ensure support for small and minority-owned
businesses for example, may also ensure that installation commanders pay more
for the materials and services that they must procure from the private sector than
they would if they could choose any available supplier. As Colonel Crawford
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decries, "Diminished resources indicates (sic) bases and stations should be cutting
personnel, however, in-house labor to provide these services is significantly
cheaper than buying services from an outside source" [Ref. 45]. Thus, it may be
more efficient for the military to fully fund the civilian workforce to correspond
to the assigned mission, rather than cutting back and forcing commanders to
purchase services on the outside.
3. The Losing Fiscal Proposition of Child Care
The enactment of the Military Child Care Act of 1989 has had a far-
reaching impact on the O&M account throughout DoD. As previously indicated
in Chapters V and VI, Congress, OSD, and HQMC have mandated specific
numbers of Child Care billets for each installation, and the Marine Corps has paid
for the new requirement by transferring funds out of other base operations
accounts. This transfer of funds has contributed significantly to the decrease in
flexibility for installation commanders.
Added to this is the burden imposed by the fact that many Child
Development Centers (CDCs) are not self-supporting due to mandated fee
structures and attempts to keep the service affordable for junior enlisted
members. El Toro, for example, has run a loss of $86,182.00 per month since
October of 1991, and MCAS, Tustin, California has run a loss of $29,540.00 per
month [Ref. 47]. This recurring loss can only lead to further transfers from the
other base operations accounts.
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One of the commonly voiced complaints against this phenomenon of
robbing base operations to pay for the CDCs is that the Marines who have to
work that much harder to make do with fewer M&S dollars are subsidizing,
through their added effort, those Marines who have children. Certainly child care
ranks very high in terms of quality of life for our Marines. But, the current
policies on CDC funding favor one group at the expense of others.
4. Cancellation of Mess Attendant Contracts
In FY 1992, Kaneohe Bay cancelled their civilian mess attendant
contract. In FY 1993, COMCABWEST may cancel mess attendant contracts at one
or more of its subordinate commands. Camp Pendleton has already computed a
temporary savings of up to $4.6 million if the majority of its mess attendant
contracts are cancelled. These drastic measures have been taken in an attempt to
temporarily increase the flexibility available to the commander.
The gain in flexibility may be illusory. Not only will the funds likely be
removed from the budget base for the subsequent year, but unexpended funds
for the current year could be recouped if justification for retention is insufficient.
The real impact of this decision is felt in the area of readiness. As discussed later,
the civilian mess attendants must be replaced by enlisted Marines, who are
consequently unavailable to train or perform their primary missions.
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5. Inability to Cover "Must Pay" Items
For FY 1992, MCAS El Toro identified significant deficiencies in
covering such fixed cost categories as utilities ($1.5 million) and contracted
services ($1.8 million) [Ref. 43]. Additionally, several of the comptrollers whom
we have contacted at installations outside our study have also indicated that they
are currently underfunded in areas including utilities. The fact that installation
commanders cannot cover bills that must be paid, leaves open to question how
much true flexibility remains, even within the budgets we have studied. As we
indicated in Chapters V and VI, the amounts identified as flexible still must cover
additional, legitimate expenses.
6. Administrative Use of Tactical Vehicles
One among many cuts that have been necessitated by the recent decline
in budget flexibility was the reduction of the commercial vehicle fleet at Camp
Pendleton. This cost saving measure is very similar to the cancellation of the mess
attendant contracts. The savings will be removed from the budget base since the
expense no longer exists. Also, the burden is passed on to the operational forces
who must use their tactical vehicles for administrative matters. As with the
cancelled mess contracts, this detracts from readiness because it increases the non-
availability of tactical assets for operational missions.
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7. Ignoring the Fences—Venturing into the Herbs
As stated in Chapter V, some fences are sturdier than others. Many of
the centrally managed programs send "spending targets" down to the installation
level, vice strictly inviolable fences. In theory, these targets represent what the
program sponsors feel is the minimum or maximum spending necessary for
proper execution of their programs. Several comptrollers interviewed indicated
that decreasing flexibility has forced them in recent years to ignore the targets in
certain categories of spending. Commanders and comptrollers realize that this
could have a negative impact on future flexibility, but the fact that they continue
to make minor adjustments between programs (not subheads) lends credence to
the argument that greater flexibility is necessary.
C. PROJECTED IMPACT
1. Added Administrative Burdens
One impact of decreased flexibility via increasing control over
installation budgets through centrally managed programs relates to the
organizational structure established to support this central management.
When a large, highly decentralized organization that is spread out
across a vast geographic area tries to create and centrally control operations, there
will be an impact upon the overall organization. In the case of the Marine Corps,
we have already identified the growth of its centrally managed programs to 37
plus. Consider the fact that each of these programs contains a staff of military and
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civilian individuals whose primary function is to track the financial, legislative,
and policy actions within and relating to its specific program. These requirements
for passing policy information to the lower levels and receiving budgeting and
accounting information from the lower echelons drain precious resources that
could otherwise be available to the installations themselves.
As centrally managed programs have grown both in number and in the
total amount oi appropriated and expended dollars, so has the complexity of
managing this system. Commanders have become increasingly burdened with
maintaining more detailed and more complex accounting records. Add to this the
fact that the newly implemented SABRS system is far from adequate to support
the budgeting and accounting demands placed on the commander. Literally every
installation we visited reverberated with dissatisfaction for the SABRS system. Not
only does the current inadequacy of the SABRS system negatively affect the
motivation of those wrestling with it, but according to those we interviewed, the
current system is not capturing accurate accounting data upon which future
funding decisions will be made. [Ref. 48].
The subsequent impact of these increased administrative burdens has
several dimensions. In addition to the draining of resources (time , money, and
personnel) away from the field and into the headquarters, the diminished
motivation of those working within the budget control system, and the generation
of inaccurate accounting data, this burgeoning bureaucracy also serves to further
undermine the authority, trust and confidence of the commanders who manage
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the installation and lead its people. The commander continually winds up in the
predicament of having to request authority that should be inherent in the
commander's position. This further frustrates and demotivates both the
commander and installation staff.
2. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation
Morale Welfare and Recreation (MWR) is one area in which the
commander can provide a significant contribution to the quality of life and morale
aboard the installation. From aerobics to yachting, MWR encompasses almost
every sports and hobby program conceivable.
For budgetary and legislative control, MWR is divided into four major
categories: (1) Mission Sustaining, (2) Basic Community, (3) Enhanced
Community, and (4) Business Activities. Each of these categories is filled with
distinctive regulations and restrictions. Currently commanders are faced with
MWR ceilings, limited direct appropriated fund support and restrictions on the
reimbursement of salaries of non-appropriated fund instrumentalities (NAFI). As
a result, many MWR services are being reduced, curtailed or forced to charge user
fees.
Tying the budgetary hands of the local commander with centralized
MWR regulations reduces the possibility of operating a program tailored to suit
the needs of the Marines who serve at the installation. Denigration of local
flexibility limits the commander's ability to maximize the program's potential in
terms of quality of life increases generated by the program, and also in terms of
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the cost-effectiveness of the overall program. Since diminished services from
MWR can undermine the morale which they were designed to enhance, and poor
morale can adversely affect performance, it is possible to extend the impact of
declining MWR assets to the issue of reduced readiness.
3. The Impact on Readiness
Overall, readiness is the most important issue in the Marine Corps.
Readiness can only be guaranteed by the outfitting, staffing and training of
combat units. Each of these readiness variables is directly related to the O&M
budget. We have found, however, that although the operational, or Fleet Marine
Force (FMF), units are the highest priority driving force within the Marine Corps,
they are often among the first to be negatively affected by the restriction of
installation budgets.
As previously mentioned, cancellation of mess attendant contracts and
the reduction of commercial vehicle fleets have a direct impact on the readiness
of the FMF. Perhaps the implementation of the Defense Business Operations Fund
(DBOF) will address the fact that the operating forces are increasingly dependent
on a budget infrastructure that has installation commanders barely keeping their
heads afloat in the support of their installations, much less performing their
primary mission of support to the FMF. This will be analyzed in the next chapter.
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D. CONCLUSION
Throughout our research, we interviewed commanders, comptrollers and
budget officers committed to the concept of budget efficiency. The data in
Chapter VI show that the flexibility necessary to achieve this budget efficiency
being reduced at the installation level. The result, as documented in the previous
chapter, is the creation of a profound set of constraints upon future efficiency and
flexibility in military budget execution.
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VIII. THE DEFENSE BUSINESS OPERATIONS FUND
The Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF) is one of the newest
initiatives within DoD. This chapter provides an analysis of the projected impact
of the DBOF on the budget flexibility of the installation commander. We begin by
building a foundation of the basic DBOF concept, its design, intended goals, and
planned implementation. We then present an analysis of the impact of this new
concept on the installation commander's budget flexibility.
A. BACKGROUND
Under the current (pre-DBOF) system, operating units (customers), are not
actually "charged" for services they receive from their host installations, regardless
of volume, and there is no system for tracking the total costs involved. This
system creates an incentive for the supported units to over-consume services, and
for supporting installation commanders to overutilize in-house assets because
"true" total costs are not considered. Furthermore, the concept of economic
opportunity costs is disregarded. The end result is overconsumption and the
inefficient allocation of resources.
In an effort to increase the efficiency of resource allocations within the DoD
through the utilization of "business-like" practices, the Secretary of Defense has
introduced the Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF). Although there are
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many aspects to this undertaking, we will focus only on those portions that will
directly impact the installation commander. We begin with a brief description of
the stated goals of DBOF, the basic concept, and the planned implementation of
the Base Operations segment of DBOF. Following this will be a discussion of the
potential impact of DBOF on the installation commander.
1. The Stated Goals of DBOF
According to the DBOF Implementation Plan presented by the Deputy
Comptroller of DoD, "The primary goal of implementing the Fund is to provide
a business management structure that encourages managers and employees of
DoD support organizations to provide quality products or services at the lowest
cost" [Ref. 49:p. 2]. This document goes on to state that, "Applying the concept of
managing to total cost provides increased flexibility to both customers and
providers" [Ref. 49:p. 3]. In the terms of the implementation plan, the installations
are the "support organizations" and "providers" mentioned above.
2. The DBOF Concept
According to Susan Grant, Deputy Director of the DBOF Project Office,
DBOF is intended to place the business operations decision making process in the
hands of operating force commanders. Removing this function from the
supporting establishment commanders is intended to increase flexibility, to make
trade off analysis possible, to optimize the use of available resources and to
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provide quality support. The idea is that if funding and resource consumption
decision responsibility rests with operating units (customers), then operating unit
opportunity costs become more apparent. Consumers should be driven towards
a more efficient level of consumption than under the public, "free" good scenario
which prevails under the current system. [Ref. 50].
Toward these ends, DoD will transfer all O&M funding to FMF units.
The supporting installations will then provide services to the operational units
strictly on a reimbursable basis. As initially formulated, DBOF would allow FMF
commanders to decide which services in the General and Administrative (G&A)
category they wished to purchase, and to shop for the best value in the services
they required. Theoretically, this shopping could be done in the private sector, as
well as other nearby military installations.
Recognizing that installations offer certain G&A services which they
must provide whether FMF commanders choose to purchase them or not, the
original plan was altered to include the concept of mandatory and discretionary
services. "Services such as safety, environmental, and fire protection must meet
statutory, community, and personnel requirements. Tenants are required to pay
a proportional share of the cost for the basic level of service." [Ref. 51 :p. 2]
Discretionary services are those which the installation commander can
choose to offer or cancel, "based on the base commander's determination that
sufficient customer demand warrants provision of the service" [Ref. 51 :p. 3].
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In addition, fixed operating and infrastructure costs will be passed on
to the operating forces by prorating the expenses and allocating them to other
services provided.
One of the most important aspects of the DBOF concept is the idea of
Unit Cost Resourcing. Under this system, "all of the costs incurred at an activity,
or within a function, should be related to an output of the activity. The goal is to
have each product or output bear as accurate a cost as possible" [Ref. 52:p. 2]. As
proposed, unit costs for all services will be computed at the DoN level and passed
down to installations throughout the Navy and Marine Corps. The installation
commander will then have to charge these prices until they are recomputed for
the following fiscal year. Under DBOF, if the actual cost exceeds the computed
unit cost, the installation commander may receive an injection of funds to cover
the shortage. Conversely, if the actual cost is less than the computed unit cost, the
gains due to the excess reimbursement could be recouped into the DoD managed
central fund.
Part of the DBOF proposal contains the concept of gainsharing. This
involves allowing the supporting establishment to retain a portion of any gains
they realize from increased efficiency in providing services. Although a specific
percentage has not been determined, the general consensus is estimated to be in
the area of 10 percent retention [Ref. 50].
The goal of gainsharing is to provide an incentive for efficiency gains
similar to that which exists in the private sector. In the private sector however,
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a firm is usually able to retain 100 percent of its gains from efficiency (less taxes)
for use as management determines to be in the best interest of the firm. The
gainsharing idea is a step in the right direction, but depending on the percentage
of retention, the incentives provided are seriously dampened.
3. DBOF and Efficiency
In operational terms, efficiency can be defined as successfully
accomplishing a given mission at the lowest total cost. Inefficiency results,
therefore, from other than mission-essential support being provided or from
mission-essential support being provided at higher than optimal cost levels. It
should be noted that quality of life programs can be categorized as mission-
essential to varying degrees.
One of the fundamental assumptions upon which the DBOF is based
is that the operational commander is in a better position to determine optimal
levels of support received from the host installation. If this assumption is valid,
the current practice of funding supporting installations and allowing them to
determine levels of support based on their budget and their commanders'
priorities (which may differ from the FMF unit commanders') is likely to result
in an inefficient allocation of resources. This is due to the fact that the installation
commander, whose mission is to provide support for the FMF commander, may
put resources into activities which the FMF commander does not need, or could
obtain at lower cost from a different source. This shift of funding control is the
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basis for claims that DBOF will force installation commanders to focus on
efficiency when providing services to the FMF.
Although it is our opinion that putting the resources in the hands of
FMF commanders could result in a more efficient allocation of resources, it is not
within the scope of our thesis to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the
DBOF proposal. Our concern here is the potential impact DBOF may have upon
the budget flexibility of the installation commander. Having highlighted the major
elements of DBOF, we now move to examining this issue.
B. DBOF AND THE INSTALLATION COMMANDER
1. Budget Flexibility
The impact of DBOF is likely to be significant. Many of those
interviewed and surveyed indicated that they believe the installation commander
will have no flexibility under DBOF. Lieutenant Colonel C. H. Thornton, Jr.,
Comptroller at MCB, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina stated,
Under DBOF, the host command /activity will have little or no 'flexibility"
to increase its budget, because the focus of its funding will be on unit cost
resourcing. It is not expected that increasing budget flexibility for host
commands/activities will be a part of the DBOF concept once implemented
[Ref. 53:p. 2].
We agree that budget flexibility as we have presented it up to this point may
cease to exist under DBOF. Installation commanders will receive no direct
funding, but will simply be reimbursed for their costs. We do, however, feel that
the installation commander will gain some budget flexibility of a different sort.
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The gainsharing system described above should give the installation
commander the opportunity to generate some budget flexibility within the
constraints of DBOF. Regardless of the percentage of gain that can be retained at
the installation, gainsharing should provide some incentive for installation
commanders to seek a more efficient allocation of resources. If cost savings can
be achieved, then gainsharing will permit some flexibility. This is true unless the
use of retained funds is severely restricted, similar to the fencing which currently
exists. In addition, there will also be perhaps even greater decisional flexibility for
the installation commander under DBOF than currently exists.
2. Decisional Flexibility
By decisional flexibility we mean the ability to choose which resources
and means to use in providing a service to the operating forces. Since the costs
of providing services will be born by the using units, the installation commander
mav not be as limited in choosing whether to utilize in-house assets or contract
out.
Some limitations will still exist, however. When deciding to contract
out, the commander will still have to conform to existing contracting and
acquisition regulations. As previously indicated, these regulations can result in
goods and services costing more (and perhaps being of inferior quality) than they
might if the commander were truly free to choose. Also, since the prices for
services are set centrally, the commander does not have unlimited flexibility to
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incur excess costs. If an installation cannot conform to published pricing guidance,
surely questions will be raised at HQMC. This is not a desirable consequence.
In stating above that budget flexibility, as we have defined it, may be
reduced under DBOF, it further supports the thesis of our study. However, the
implementation of the DBOF will have an impact on budget flexibility beyond
that borne by the installation commander.
C SHIFTING THE FLEXIBILITY DILEMMA
Under DBOF, the budget flexibility algorithm we developed remains valid.
Budget flexibility as we define it will not disappear with the arrival of DBOF.
However, it is likely to be shifted from the installations onto the operating forces
of the FMF.
There will still be mandatory programs such as child care, MRP,
environmental management, FECA, etc. The costs of these programs will simply
be shifted into the FMF budget base. The installations will still have fixed costs
such as utilities, civilian labor and contracts, and these costs also will be shifted
to the FMF budget base. The FMF will also retain the fixed costs and mandatory
programs which are peculiar to itself. In addition, the operating forces will inherit
the resource drain of a potentially more complicated budget justification process
and the labyrinthine accounting systems which will be necessary to allow the
FMF unit commander to make the difficult choices about which services to
purchase where.
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As indicated in Chapter VI, top-line budgets showed steady real declines
from FY 1988 to FY 1992. All of the above indicators lead us to the conclusion that
budget flexibility will be shifted from the installation commander to the FMF
units under DBOF.
D. CONCLUSION
If the base operations portion of DBOF is enacted as it has been formulated,
the FMF commanders will face a combination of existing FMF flexibility
problems, in addition to those documented at our subject installations. For this
reason, the advent of DBOF does not invalidate our premise. Rather, it suggests
that further studies on budget flexibility, as we have outlined it in this thesis, will
need to focus on the effect of DBOF on the operating forces vice the installations.
There is a need to study the decisional flexibility of installation commanders
under DBOF. Recommendations for further study in the area of budget flexibility
will be included in the following chapter.
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IX. SOLUTIONS TO THE FLEXIBILITY DEFICIENCY
Thus far, this thesis has established that budget flexibility is a vital factor in
attaining optimum efficiency for resource allocation and that budget flexibility for
the installation commanders studied is dangerously low. This chapter presents
some specific recommendations for restoring the level of flexibility to facilitate a
more efficient allocation of resources at installations and within DoD.
These recommendations are presented in a three tiered framework. First, we
provide recommendations for commanders to utilize at the installation level.
Second, we offer suggestions for HQMC and DoD. Third, and finally, we propose
changes at the congressional level. We point out here, that a few of these
recommendations may appear radical or even ludicrous at first glance. Our desire
is to identify opportunities to forge a new frontier, or rather regenerate a return
to the basic concept of command, responsibility and authority. Furthermore, if
nothing else, we wish to provide an impetus for thought and action on ways to
improve our Marine Corps. We begin at the installation level.
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A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INSTALLATION COMMANDER
1. Zero Based Budgeting
Fiscal austerity and minimum flexibility may best be handled with a
detailed examination and validation of the entire budget—starting from ground
zero. Zero Based Budgeting, or ZBB, has been in existence for some time. Mr. Don
Angel, Comptroller of COMCABWEST, strongly advocates and utilizes this
concept in his managment duties. Mr. Angel's approach first identifies the "Core
Programs" of the installation and places these as part of the installation's
foundation. Upon this foundation, he develops a hierarchy of programs that will
be funded as resources are available. "Thinking in terms of programs," not just
individual dollars will help establish a more effective perspective for analysis of
the budget [Ref. 44]. By allowing commanders to sort out the programs which are
consuming more resources than necessary, ZBB can aid in generating flexibility.
The goal is increased efficiency in all areas, leaving greater resources available for
use wherever needed. Several financial management books have been published
and are available on the ZBB concept. Although ZBB has proved unworkable at
the executive department level, installations may be small enough for it to be
effective. It is worth a try.
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2. Collective Efforts
Recognizing that the best solutions to difficult problems often result
from a team approach can be the first step to discovering additional flexibility.
Once again, we cite managerial tools utilized by Mr. Angel. At COMCABWEST,
Mr. Angel has formed Resource and Position Management Boards. As their name
implies, resource boards examine the budget in terms of the resources available
to the installation while trying to allocate them efficiently, vice having each
separate functional area considering their individual concerns. Position boards
operate similarly, but their focus is human assets. This collective slicing and
comprehensive analysis of an installation's budget allocation can foster teamwork
and unity while resulting in the optimum allocation of resources within the
installation. These boards also bring together the expertise, experience, and ideas
of all the units at the installation, recognizing that good ideas come from all levels
within an organization, not just from "top" management.
3. Examine and Reengineer
All of the individuals we interviewed in one form or another,
mentioned the need to examine "how we do business" and to look for ways to
implement improvements. Captain Judi Mellon, Comptroller of Marine Corps Air
Station, Tustin recommends utilizing the Management By Wandering Around
(MBWA) concept. Getting to know exactly how and where the installation's
resources are going to be employed provides a deeper understanding of the needs
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of the base and a means to identify possible improvements. [Ref. 54]. This is
consistent with principles of TQM.
The second element of this approach—reengineering-requires taking
a totally different perspective towards operations. Changes on the margin may
provide some positive benefits, but an entire subsystem overhaul may yield
benefits of a greater amount. This approach ignores the "thafs the way it has
always been done" mindset, and seeks totally new approaches to the same old
problems. One possible form of reengineering is to examine all existing private
sector contracts. The commander may eliminate those that do not result in
efficient service and renegotiate those that have minor inefficiencies within them.
The key is to not stifle creativity and innovation in searching for new solutions
to old problems.
4. Total Quality Leadership/Total Quality Management
One means to generate improvements within the existing system is to
fully adopt TQL/TQM. Although we feel that the principles of leadership as
embodied by the United States Marine Corps encompass the Deming philosophy,
there are nuances that are worth trying. The central themes of continual
improvement of processes and the empowerment of individuals within the
organization are key to establishing and maintaining an efficient unit and a
satisfying, rewarding work environment. The proper employment of TQL/TQM
at installations may generate additional efficiencies and cost savings and thereby
increase the amount of a commander's budget flexibility.
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5. Share Your Success
At the opening of the 1992 Financial Management Conference in San
Diego, California, Lieutenant General Robert J. Winglass, Deputy Chief of Staff,
Installations and Logistics, HQMC, took the attendees by surprise when he called
upon individuals from the attendance roster and asked them to share at least one
fiscal success story with the audience. The key here is to not assume that your
successes are limited in application to your installation or that other installations
are already aware of them. [Ref. 55].
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HQMC AND DOD
1. Eliminate Centrally Managed Funds and Program Sponsors
Although this recommendation appears radical, we feel that the current
downsizing of the entire military and the Corps necessitates such a move. Taking
such action would allow HQMC to accomplish two significant goals. First,
bestowing the responsibility of financial management on individual commanders
is in keeping with the Marine Corps philosophy of command. Second, eliminating
additional non-FMF billets would provide additional assets to the FMF. Drastic
times call for drastic actions.
2. Dismantle the Fences
Reduce the floors, raise the ceilings, and empower the commanders.
For over 217 years Marine commanders have upheld their commitment to
superior performance and have consistently proven that when given authority
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commensurate with their responsibility, the sky is the limit. Realizing that
congressional approval is necessary for some of this action to occur, some can be
undertaken within DoD.
3. SABRS—Fix it or Flush it
As mentioned earlier, it is readily apparent within Marine Corps
financial managment that there are significant problems with SABRS. We
recommend that the problems be assessed and a decision be made as to whether
they can be adequately remedied within a reasonable timeframe and budget.
Additionally, we recommend that if it appears that this repair timeline cannot be
adhered to, or if additional problems begin to surface, a decision be made to abort
SABRS. As with any strategy, a fallback plan to another system should be
prepared and implemented if necessary. We no longer have the ability to continue
to throw time and money at a problem until it is fixed.
4. Pure Manage To Payroll
Although we have not extensively discussed the MTP program as a
non-monetary form of fencing and its effect of reducing flexibility, this
recommendation can stand on its own. Very simply, we recommend that if the
fence on labor dollars cannot be removed, the MTP program should at least be
implemented as designed. This calls for the elimination of endstrength and
workyear controls. The only restriction should be total dollars allocated to payroll.
The implementation of MTP is another example of an excellent idea being
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corrupted and negated by excessive restriction. Once again, we must place faith
in the discretion of our commanders.
5. Intersubhead Transfers
In keeping with our theme of increasing the authority of installation
commanders, we recommend that the restrictions on intersubhead transfers at the
installation level be relaxed. This was accomplished during the Unified Budget
Test (UBT) by allowing transfers to take place at the installation level, while
balancing the accounts at the service level. The UBT demonstrated that only a
small percentage of funds were actually shifted at any one installation.
6. Change the Budget Philosophy
Given the lack of authority for commanders to roll forward funding
from one year to the next, a command should not be labelled fiscally incompetent
if the commander feels that it is in the best interests of the unit, the Marine Corps,
or the government to turn money back to higher headquarters. As we mentioned
earlier, mandating the one hundred percent expenditure of funds probably results
in unnecessary purchases. We feel that it is inappropriate to penalize a
commander by reducing the following year's budget base as a result of the
commander turning money back to higher headquarters. The choice seems to be
between honesty and forced compliance.
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7. Modify Incentive Programs
The presence of monetary incentive programs like the Shared Energy
Savings program, DMRD 907, and the Recycle program are excellent examples of
ways to increase budget flexibility and accomplish honorable cost and
environmental savings. But, guidelines for these programs stipulate that any
savings achieved must be expended in the same budget area to attempt even
greater savings. Why limit the commander in how to spend the unit's earned
savings? If the commander, using the advice of the installation's functional
experts, feels that more savings can be accomplished through additional
conservation efforts, that commander will pursue both the conservation efforts
and the accompanying financial rewards. Conversely, if the commander is
restricted to expending earned savings in pursuit of additional energy savings,
which may cost more than the resultant savings, the end result is a mandated
waste of resources. The installation commander should be afforded the authority
to choose how, and in which areas, to obligate savings generated through
increased efficiency. In so doing, DoD would establish the strongest possible
incentive for increased efficiency.
8. Revive the Unified Budget
Based on the success of the Unified Budget test and the findings of the
managerial experts referenced throughout this thesis, we recommend that, at a
minimum, additional installations conduct another unified budget test. Optimally,
a commander would be provided with one pool of money to be obligated
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according to the commander's discretion. We contend that providing this type of
budget with adequate incentives and limited restrictions to today's highly capable
commanders will result in the kind of efficiency and effectiveness desired within
the DoD.
9. Contract Out for Installation Management
Perhaps our most unorthodox recommendation is to eliminate the
installation commander and contract with a private management firm for
installation management. The two major objections to this recommendation-1) a
reduction in available command billets, and 2) an installation manager who may
be insensitive to the needs and problems of the FMF commander--are both valid.
However, as asserted in Chapter II, commanding an installation in the current
inflexible environment may actually mute a commander's natural tendencies
toward initiative and flexibility. This potential inculcation of undesirable traits
means that the loss of these leadership billets might not actually harm the
development of our combat leaders.
In addition, under the DBOF proposal, an installation manager may not
be in a position to ignore the needs of the FMF commander. The installation
manager will be more dependent upon the FMF commander for funding. Also,
the competition for services and scrutiny of installation budgets required under
DBOF is intended to ensure that the manager has incentives to provide services
to the FMF in an efficient manner.
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One final consideration related to this recommendation is the
impending force reduction within the military. By eliminating the billets necessary
for installation management, the military may be able to reduce manning levels
without significantly degrading the force strengths in the operating forces.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONGRESS
Congress is in a powerful position to influence the level of budget flexibility
at the installation level. Obviously recommending that DoD receive increased
funding is irrelevant. We do have, however, some recommendations on how
Congress can do its part in solving the budget flexibility dilemma.
1. Responsible Legislation
Congress needs to take more responsibility for the impact that its
legislation has on those who are affected at the lowest levels. This is a blanket
responsibility, not just for the defense committees. As indicated in Chapter III,
many non-defense committees pass legislation with direct impact on DoD
activities. It is not enough to simply acknowledge that jurisdictions overlap
among committees. The far-reaching effects of legislation must be anticipated.
New programs mandated through legislation should be required to provide
funding commensurate with the new requirements. It is irresponsible for
Congress to ask DoD and the installation commanders to take new expenses out
of hide, because the hide is wearing thin.
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2. Remove Child Care From the DoD Mission
The military is in existence for the purpose of deterring aggression and
fighting wars if need be. At the current time, DoD is forced to conduct business
in areas beyond the realm of expertise which is requisite for completion of the
primary mission. Child care is one such area. We do not deny the importance of
child care to military families trying to make both ends meet on government
salaries. Our position is rather that DoD is not likely to be the most efficient
provider of this service.
Another argument against putting DoD in the child care business is
that money taken from base operations to support child care is money which
formerly benefitted all Marines, but now only benefits those with families. Our
proposal here is the establishment of a Basic Allowance for Child Care, similar to
the Basic Allowance for Subsistance (BAS) and Basic Allowance for Quarters
(BAQ). This would allow greater flexibility, not only to the installation
commander, but to the individual Marines themselves.
3. Allow More Flexible Use of Lapsed Funding
This is a self-explanatory concept. The time restriction on the use of
appropriated funds is a significant barrier to the efficient allocation of resources;
witness the end-of-year spending frenzies which occur within O&M. The slow-
spending procurement accounts are set up with flexibility in mind. This same
approach to O&M would reduce the tendencies toward wasteful spending at
year's end, while opening up a new door on flexibility. The O&M budget should
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be appropriated in a two year format, and commands should be allowed more
flexibility to roll funds forward from one year to the next.
D. A RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER STUDY
As previously mentioned, we recommend that the issue of decreasing
budget flexibility be studied further. Additional studies could include the
documented impact of DBOF on budget flexibility if DBOF is enacted in its
intended form. A continuation of this thesis is possible, as is a subsequent study
in several years to determine if any action has been taken to increase flexibility.
E. CONCLUSION
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, many of our recommendations
may seem too comprehensive at first glance. It is also true that most, if not all, of
our recommendations may be opposed by counter-arguments with some merit.
Our purpose in making these recommendations is to stimulate thought and
discussion. We are entering into an era of unprecedented budget austerity for
DoD and now is the right time to question orthodox thinking and practices in the
budgetary arena.
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X. CONCLUSIONS ON DECREASING BUDGET FLEXIBILITY
Throughout this thesis, we have maintained the importance of budget
execution flexibility. Our argument in Chapter II supported this contention by
highlighting the importance placed on flexibility in other military activities, as
well as the private sector budget arena. We are not unique in our belief in the
desirability of budget flexibility within the military.
Recalling the discussion of the O-l budget justification in Chapter III, the FY
1993 Conference Report on Defense Appropriations stated that Congress does not
seek to undermine the flexibility of military commanders. Congress is not the only
entity in the DoD budget hierarchy that professes to support the importance of
budget flexibility.
To paint the picture within DoD, we begin by presenting an excerpt from
a Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum dated 26 March 1986:
Here are three things we must accomplish: First, give more authority to the
doers, linking responsibility with authority and push both down to lower
organizational levels.... Cancel or rewrite regulations that limit installation
commander's freedom to do their jobs.
Second, free installation commanders to purchase goods and services
wherever they can get the combination of quality, responsiveness, and cost
that best satisfies their requirements... giving our commanders as much
freedom as possible to make intelligent use of their resources.
Third, strengthen the commander's incentive and ability to save money. Let
commander's keep some of the money they save and decide how to spend
their share [Ref. 56:p. 1].
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This memorandum, generated by the same official who initiated the Unified
Budget Test, was followed by DoD Directive 4001.1 o( September 4, 1986 which
promulgated the identical three stipulations. The Marine Corps subsequently
published Marine Corps Order (MCO) 5200.25 indicating a commitment to the
intent of the Deputy's policy.
In 1989, the Fiscal Director of the Marine Corps stated in a memorandum
that, "it is absolutely essential, and basic Marine Corps policy holds, that as much
flexibility as possible be afforded to commanders in the execution of their
financial plan. ...each commander is authorized to realign O&MMC funded
resources to increase budget flexibility. This authority extends to funding
provided by HQMC program sponsors" [Ref. 57:p. 1].
It is true that the Fiscal Director has acted to protect flexibility for
installations, but there are still conflicting signals which emanate from HQMC in
this area. Comparing the highly restrictive budget control system, as measured
using our budget flexibility algorithm, with the stated policies of the Congress,
the Secretary of Defense, and HQMC, it is readily apparent that something is
amiss. Authors Waterman, Peters, and Phillips state, "Organizations may listen to
what managers say, but they believe what managers do. Not words, but patterns
of actions are decisive" [Ref. 58:p. 22]. Higher authorities have preached flexibility,
yet they have installed tight-fisted control.
Since 1986, and especially during the time period we analyzed in Chapters
III through VI, the decrease in top-line budgets and the increase in the amount
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of congressional line-item oversight, fenced funds, centrally managed programs,
and the corresponding decrease in installation budget flexibility seem to indicate
the prevalence of an overall philosophy that undermines the stated intent of
increasing budgetary discretion for installation commanders.
There is little which can be done about the political and economic
environment that leads to decreasing budgetary resources within DoD. Likewise,
the fixed costs associated with mission accomplishment can be reduced only so
far. But the same is not true in the area of budget fencing and mandatory
programs. As Robert Frost stated in his poem The Mending Wall, "Something there
is that doesn't love a wall" [Ref. 59:p. 33]. It is no longer sufficient to rely on the
old maxim that "good fences make good neighbors."
As recommended in Chapter IX, Congress and the DoD budget hierarchy
must begin to place a real emphasis on restoring the flexibility of the installation
commander if DoD is to become a more efficient organization. This means
reexamining not only the programs and fences, but the missions installation
commanders are required to perform.
The Marine Corps has prided itself on what may be termed "visionary
leadership." We look for innovative solutions to age-old problems, and have
historically exhibited a maverick image. The budget flexibility dilemma requires
innovation and "visionary leadership." Quoting from Burt Nanus' book, Visionary
Leadership,
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Be flexible and patient in implementing... Once the proper sense of direction has
been determined... By delegating implementation decisions to those closest
to the issues at hand and by allowing employees considerable flexibility...
you are allowing others to take ownership. ..and experience pride... Apart
from the energizing aspects of such an approach, it allows for many small
experiments and learning experiences to take place and also insulates the
organization from major errors that almost surely would follow from top-
down planning or supervision
[Ref. 60:p. 170].
This "flexible and patient" approach is neither visionary nor exceptionally
innovative at this point in time. It is simply a common sense application of the
historical Marine Corps bias toward reinforcing initiative at all levels.
For generations, Marine commanders have been trusted in battle with the
most sacred resource our nation possesses—its youth. No leader has ever been
more revered than the one whose initiative and flexibility resulted in victory on
the battlefield with fewer losses and casualties than would have occurred had the
detailed orders of a superior gone unchallenged.
The Marine Corps and the entire Department of Defense must continue to
inspire initiative and flexibility. Now is not the time to corral the initiative of our
installation commanders, giving them little alternative but to behave like
frightened, starving sheep. There will never be such a time!
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APPENDIX A. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AO Administering Office for budget formulation and execution
BA Budget Authority
BASECOM Base Communications
BASEOPS Base Operation Support (BOS)
CBO Congressional Budget Office
CMC Commandant of the Marine Corps
DBOF Defense Business Operations Fund












Department of the Navy
Decision Unit (Code)
Expense Element
Fiscal Director of the Marine Corps
Federal Employment Compensation Act


























Headquarters, United States Marine Corps
Marine Air Ground Financial Accounting Reporting System
Marine Corps Air Station
Marine Corps Base
Military Construction Appropriation
Maintenance of real property (referred to by Congress as
RPM—Real property maintenance)
Morale, Welfare and Recreation
Navy Comptroller
Operation and Maintenance Appropriation
Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps Appropriation
Office of Management and Budget
Operating Budget
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Line item O&M budget justification package prepared for Congress
by DoD
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
Program Package Code
Personnel Support Equipment
Line item Procurement budget justification package prepared for
Congress by DoD
Reduction in Force
Line item Research and Development budget justification package
prepared for Congress by DoD
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SABRS Standard Accounting and Budgeting Reporting System
SAC Senate Appropriations Committee
SASC Senate Armed Services Committee
SecDef Secretary of Defense
SIK Subsistence in Kind
SWA Service-wide Activities
TAVSC Training and Audiovisual Support Center
TQM Total Quality Management
UBT Unified Budget Test
2BO PPC for BOS
2BC PPC for BASECOM
2FO PPC for Right Operations
2SW PPC for Service-wide Activities
7SP PPC for SIK
8SS PPC for Special Skill Training
8TS PPC for Training Support
80D PPC for Off Duty Education
80S PPC for Other Personnel Support
90A PPC for Other Administrative
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APPENDIX B. PRIMARY SOURCES OF DATA
A. OPERATING BUDGETS
The operating budgets for Kaneohe Bay and Camp Pendleton were very
similar, except for the different sources for each—Camp Pendleton's originating
at HQMC and Kaneohe's originating at FMFPac. An example of a Kaneohe Bay
OPBUD is located on pages 181-182. The OPBUDs for El Toro were locally
generated versions of the NAVCOMPT form 2168-1 used by the other
installations. An Example of an El Toro OPBUD is located on pages 183-187.
As is readily apparent, the OPBUDs divide the funds into subheads and
direct and reimbursable funding, giving subtotals for each category. In the
remarks section of each OPBUD can be found some of the spending restrictions
and fences applicable to the installation. Also in the remarks section is a summary
of the changes which have occurred since the previous OPBUD was issued.
From the OPBUDs we were able to determine total 2720 funding available,
as well as some of the fences imposed by higher authorities. The remarks section
on the El Toro OPBUDs was much more detailed than those for the other
installations. This made up for the fact that COMCABWEST does not issue
funding authorization messages to its subordinate commands. We were able to
determine most of the fenced amounts for El Toro directly from the OPBUDs.
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B. FUNDING AUTHORIZATION MESSAGES
Both Kaneohe Bay and Camp Pendleton received funding authorization
messages from the next highest echelon in the budget hierarchy. Two examples
of Camp Pendleton funding authorization messages can be found on pages 188
and 189.
Easily identifiable on each message are the date of transmission, the origin
and the installation involved, as well as the following: the subhead, the quarter
of the fiscal year, and the dollar amount of the change. In addition, if the funds
are provided for a specific purpose, this will also be annotated in the message.
The first message shows that the funding has been "provided for collateral
equipment for FY89 MCON project P-954, Multi-purpose facility, Bridgeport." This
is a definitely identified specific purpose and would fall into our Other Fenced
category of funding. The other message shows that the funds provided "will be
applied to maintenance floor." These funds are included in MRP, but are not
included in the computation of flexibility as explained in Chapter V.
C. 10890 REPORT B
The MAGFARS 10890 Report B was available for all fiscal years from FY
1988 to FY 1991 at both Kaneohe Bay and Camp Pendleton. An example of a
10890 Report B appears on pages 190-198.
The 10890s enabled us to break out the fixed costs which were applicable to
our computation of flexibility. Identified in the heading portion of the report is
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the installation, the date of the report, the appropriation with fiscal year (the third
digit of the appropriation data identifies the fiscal year), and the subhead (the last
four digits of the appropriation data).
The body of the 10890 contains several columns of information. The first
column is the Decision Unit (DU). This identifies the major spending category
within the subhead. It includes such categories as Base Communications, MRP,
MWR Support, Utility Operations, General Engineering Support, etc. The third
column is also important. It contains the Function/Sub-function (FSF) code. The
most important aspect oi this column for our research is that it identifies direct
and reimbursable spending. Reimbursibles have a "z" as the second character in
this column. Since we did not include reimbursibles in our study, this allowed us
to remove them from the totals. The fifth column is the Expense Element (EE).
This is a detailed breakdown into type of spending within DU. For our purposes,
the relevant EEs were "U" (Civilian Labor), "M" (Utilities and Rents) and "Q"
(Purchased Services, Other). By totaling each EE and subtracting the amounts for
those DUs which were already accounted for in one of the fencing categories, we
were able to calculate fixed costs for Labor, Utilities and Purchased Services. The
final fixed cost of Messhall Contracts was obtained from the comptroller at each
installation.
As previously explained, we were unable to locate copies of Report B of the
10890 for El Toro. For this reason, some of the fixed cost amounts for El Toro
were calculated by the station comptroller's office from other records. The source
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was not strictly comparable to the other installations, but consistency was
maintained across fiscal years for El Toro.
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HEADQUARTERS, "ARINE CORPS USES, PACIFIC
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TOTAL OIR/REIN/OBL AUTH PtI 8,586,039 7,542,416 6,987,300 6,060,420 29,176,175
CHC .50,000 45C.0C0
TOTAL OBL1C AUTH SUBJ 31 U.S.C. SECT. 1517 REV 8,586,039 7,992,416 6,987,300 6,060,420 29,626,175
REMARKS:
1. S26.626.175 OF ABOVE AMOUNT IS OBLIGATIONS AUTHORITY SUBJECT TO 31 U.S.C. SECTION 1517 ON A CUMULATIVE QUARTERLY BASIS,
WHICH MAY BE INCREASES BY THE AMOUNT OF REIMBURSABLE ORDERS RECEIVES (FUNDED).
2. 8450,000 INCREASE IS THE NET OF THE FOLLOWING ADJUSTMENTS:
a. ISO, 000 INCREASE FOR CABLE PLANT UPGRADE; COMMARCORBASESPAC 141914Z FEB 92
b. 1100,000 INCREASE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HCT; COMMARCORBASESPAC 1419142 FEB 92
c. SJOO.OOC INCREASE CORROSION CNTL STUDY; COMMARCORBASESPAC 0222142 MAR 72
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3. TME AMOUNTS ESTABLISHED FOR THE FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE TARGETS (NOT SUBJECT TO 11 U.S.C. SECT 1517)
:
. 19, 50', 539 OF OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY IS FOR MAINTENANCE OF REAL PROPERTY FACILITIES AND SHOULD NOT BE
OECREASED WITHOUT PRIOR COMMARCORBASESPAC APPROVAL, ANO IS NOT AVAILABLE FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
r 1911,816 Of OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY IS FOR FLICHT OPERATIONS ANO SHOULD NOT BE EXCEEDED WITHOUT PRIOR
APPROVAL OF THE COMMARCORBASESPAC.
tf U93.000 Of OBLICATIOHAL AUTHORITY IS PROVIDED FOR SUBSISTENCE - IN-rlHO AND IS HOT TO BE EXCEEDED WITHOUT
PRIOR COMMARCORBASESPAC APPROVAL, AND IS HOT AVAILABLE FOR OTHER PURPOSES. FUNDS ARE FOR A AMD B RATIONS.
*T $30,000 OF OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY IS FOR AC* I CULTURAL OUTLEASE PROGRAM ANO SHOULD HOT BE EXCEEDED WITHOUT
PRIOR APPROVAL Of THE COMMARCORBASESPAC.
t. 111,191,000 Of OBLICATIOHAL AUTHORITY IS FOR MANAGE TO PAYROLL" PROVIDED ON INITIAL LOA DTO
22 OCT 91 AMD SHOULD HOT BE EXCEEDED WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE COMMARCORBASESPAC.
yr 136,800 OF OBLIGATIrtONAL AUTHORITY IS PROVIDED FOR DOO DRUG PROGRAM. FUNOING IS SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED
FOR DOD DRUG PROGRAM EXPENSES AND CANNOT BE USED FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
*. REALIGNMENT Of OBLICATIOHAL AUTHORITY BETWEEN SUBHEADS IS HOT AUTHORIZED.
5. FUNDIHG FOR SUBSEQUENT QUARTERS IS NOT AVAILABLE FOR OBLIGATION UNTIL THE FIRST DAY OF THE APPLICABLE QUARTER.
£ S 2,997,000 Of BASE OPERATIOHS FUNDS ARE FOR UTILITIES. THIS AMOUNT IS A BASE FOR DEFICIENCY DETERMINATION.
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COHCABWEST VARIATION OF
NAVCOKPT POM 2161-1 (HECH)
PROH: COHHAJroa
MARINE CORPS AIR RASES, WESTERN A1EA
NARIIfE CORPS AIR STATION
EL TORO (SAJI7A MIA), a 92709-5001
TO: COmAHDIHG GENUAL (CODE 1PB)
KAIIITC CORPS AIR STATION
EL TORO (SANTA ANA), CA 92709-5001
RESOURCE ALT30Ri:ATI0M
1. Annual Sub-Operatioq Budget
SUB-OPBUD »0. 60050
APPK HO. 1711106
SUBHEAD: 2720 i 2780 4
jmarororr no-, i






TOTAL CHANGES III OVDEL TOTAL DIRECT OPERATING
DIRECT EXPENSES ORDERS BCDGET/NOA
FISCAL INCREASE QCAJTE5LT INaEASE QOAJfTERlI INCREASE QGAJrTERLT
Oil (DEOEASE) iflOCKT (DECREASE) ANOCNT (DECREASE) AJWUNT
(1) (2) (3) («) (5) (6) (7)
FIRST 12734433 12734433
SECOND -312576 10508094 -312576 10508094
THIRD -205715 10295127 -205715 10295127
FOORTB -205715 13407862 -205715 13407862
TOTAL -724006 46945516 -724006 46945516
2. A recap of your adjusted annual Rev Obliqational Authority
herein is as follows, by quarterly apportionment:
NOA) based on the transactions specified
PEN 264961 PEN 26495K PEN 2809ON PEN 26496N PEN 26496H
FISCAL BASE OPS TELECOm A/VISUAL AG 0' LEASE RECTC NATLS
<m /- (080) /- (080) /- (080) /- (080) /- (080)
FIRST 5191615 445385 55390 '0
SECOND -361211 4216557 3362 313252 33651 86732 19900 199O0
THIRD -205332 4635002 -23019 194511 16825 70177 9950 9950
FOURTH -205332 4777434 -23019 283964 16825 69660 9950 9950
TOTAL -771875 19520601
PEN 21212*
-42676 1237112 67301 281959
PEN 264961
39800 39800
PEN 26496N PEN 264961
FISCAL SVC-WM SUB-TOTAL ACrT OM OTH AVN SPT UHLN AVDLRS
QT1 /* (080) /• 080 /- (080) /- (080) /- (080)
FIRST 6392390 233684 60370 15250
SECOND 533543 -304298 5169984 139008 45547 15250
THUD 54771 -201576 4964411 91670 37784 15250
FOURTH 54771 -201576 5195779 91670 38484 15250
TOTAL 643045 -707450 21722564 556032 182185 61000
PAGE 1
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QOARTERLT APPORTI0NH£XT RECAP (CONT'D)
PEN 26496H PEH 26496H SUB-TOTAL PEK 26494H PQf 26494H
FISCAL FIT SIH AVDLRS HAOTS-1 OHH FLT OPS PROC GO ZK UTILITIES
Qtl »/- (OBO) /- (OBO) /- (OBO) /- (IMA) /- (RPUA)
FIRST 31500 340804 1348726 1406450
SECOND 105OO 210305 22920 592793 -31198 1362394
third 144704 11461 956025 -15600 1488262
FOOTfTH 145404 11461 843833 -15600 1995086
TOTAL 42000 841217 45842 3741377 -62398 6252192
SUB-TOTAL GRAND PEH 26494H PEX 264««)l PEH 264«4H
RPKA TOTAL HRP (Hl/tl) HRP (H2) HRP (R2i
QTR /• (OBO) /- OBO /- (RPKA) / (RPKA) /- (RPRA)
FIRST 2755176 9488370 2242346 67705 325800
SECOND -1271 1955117 -312576 7335476 2574365
THIRD -4139 2444287 -205715 7553402 2584025
FOURTH -4139 2838919 -205715 8180102 5077760
TOTAL -16556 9993569 -724006 32557350 12478496 67705 325800
TOTAL
FISCAL SUB-TOTAL SUBBZAD PEN 72891JI PEH 71212H PEK 72892H
QTR /• HRP /- .2720 /- CHSRT OPS /• SVC-WIDE /- SUBSISTEHa
FIRST 2635851 12124221 460212
SECOND 2574365 -312576 9909841 455953
THIRD 2584025 -205715 10137427
FOURTH 5077760 -205715 13257862
TOTAL 12872001 -724006 45429351 916165
TOTAL TOTAL GRAHD
FISCAL SUBHEAD 1m 89732H PEK 89732H SUBHEAD TOTAL
<m /- .2770 /- TA v- BSEP /- .2780 »/• SUB-OPBCD
FIRST 460212 146600 3400 150000 12'T34433
SECOND 455953 135100 6500 142300 -312576 10508094
THIRD 152800 4900 157700 -205715 10295127
FOURTH 145100 4200 150000 -205715 13407862




3. Pundinq provided herein is obliqational authority subiect to 31 O.S.C. Section 1517 on a emulative
quarterly basis, which may be increased by the aaount of funded reimbursable orders received.
4. Bach individual sub-account within PEHs identified above establishes an annual limitation for that sub-
account which cannot be exceeded without prior approval of this headquarters (AF).
5. The KW> tarqet reflected on the IC-2199 in Statistical Account /OA32 will equate to the annual aiounts
authorized in the above sub-accounts TOP (Hi/11)", MOP (H2)\ and "IBP (12)".
6. Increases and/or decreases to the civilian labor annual financial plan will not be implemented without
prior approval of this headquarters (AP).
7. In addition to the above sub-account limitations, the follovinq annual administrative and/or statutory
limitations are established and cannot be exceeded without prior approval of this headquarters (AF):
a. linor Construction — $176,000
b. Fliqhtline Security (Floor) -- $62,000
c. ADP - $1,371,126 (Includinq $635,660 CIVPEIS labor)
d. TAD - $322,750 ($252,750 Direct Base 0ps/$70,000 Oth Avn Spt)
e. External PAO - $2,300
f. Utilities (Floor i Ceilinq) -- $6,057,590 (Excludes CIVPEIS labor)
q. Hessmen Contract (Floor) -- $235, 44
J
h. Horale, Welfare 4 iecreation - $672,591
i. crvPFJB Labor (Floor I Ceilinq) — $26,074,849 authorized/restricted as follows, based on the
ABO 12510. LA manaqinq to payroll concept:
Direct OC-ll Direct OC-12 leimb 0C-11 ieimb 0C-12
(1) COT 61,271 13,9*3 K/A l/A
(2) 700 Hr Appt l/A l/A
(3) All Other 19,735,151 3,637,097 2,183,360 436,910
TOT1L 19,103,429 3,651,010 2,183,360 436,980
j. COT TAD (Floor i Ceiling) - $0
k. HAWTS-l Direct Base Ops (Tarqet Limitation) - l/A
1. Overtime/Preiim Pay — $252,750
m. Central Program PSI — $3,771
d. Central Proqru FP4SI (Dininq) — $0
o. Central Program HOOI Collateral Equipment •- $0




Ref: (a) HOS El Toro (1PB) E-Mail of 17 Jan 91
(b) Verbal discussion btwn OONCABWIS? (AFB) and HCAS El Toro (1FB) budget reps of
25 Jan 91
1. In confiraation of references (a) and (b), this amendment decreases ET91 OflC funds and
ROA/Sipense Authority in the net Mount of $724,006 based upon the following actions:
a. Base Ops - let decrease of $771,175 is follow:
1) Decrease of $121, 335 for Chilian labor adjustments. Reference (a) pertains.
2) Increase of $55,281 central program drug funding. Included in this funding is $692 to
support UCAS Tustin training and audiovisual requirements. Reference (b) pertains.
3) Decrease of $901 excess alcohol fundinq. Included in your financial plan is $232
to support HCA5 Tustin traininq and audiovisual requirements. Reference (b) pertains.
4) Decrease of $4,920 withdrawn for central fundinq to support the COHS contract.
This action reduces your ADP limitation. Reference (b) pertains.
b. Telecot - Ret decrease of $42,676 as follows:
1) Decrease of $92,076 for civilian labor adjustments. Reference (a) pertains.
2) Increase of $49,400 to support cahle upgrade at HCAS El Toro ($38,600) and
IKA3 amp Pendleton ($10,000). Seference (b) pertains.
c. AG O'Lease - Increase of $39,800 to support civilian labor costs.
d. Gen Enqr - Increase of $45,842 for civilian labor adjustments. Reference (a)
pertains.
e. HIP (Mill) - Realignment in the amount of $9,176 from civilian labor to material.
Reference (a) pertains.
f. Utilities - Decrease of $62,398 for civilian labor adjustments. Reference (a)
pertains.





2. Additionally, this aiendient decreases your OC-11 and OC-12 authority in the
aiount of $723,628 and $141,214, respectively. leference (a) pertains.









R 130042Z JUN 90 ZY8 PSN 9«0134S2l
Fm CMC WASHINGTON DC//FD8/FDF/LCO/LFL//
To CC MCB CAMp PENOLETON CA//COMPT//
8T
UnCLAS //N07130//
Sg8Jt FY<»0 U«MC FUNDING
"3GIO/GENADMIN/CMC FD8//
RgF/A/PMC/CMC WASH DC / 080 1 32 Z JUN90 //
AmPN/COLLATEPaL EQUIP POP FY89 HCON PROJ P-95a//
RMKS/
1. IAW THE R£F, OP8U0 FUND AUTHORIZATION UNDER 170U06 REVISED AS
FqLLOwS:





P. OBLIGATION AUTHORITY INCREASED 90,942 DOLLARS
G. OPBUO AMEND POLS
2. FUNOING PROVIDED FOR COLLATERAL EQUIPMENT FOR FY89 MCON PROJECT

































«t958Z FEB 90 2Y8 PSN 98788534S
CMC WASHINGTON 0C//LFF-2/F0F/FDB/LC0//







SJl FY92 FAC PROJ PROG
CG HCB C*MP PENDLETON CA 1818062 OEC 89
PHONCON BT^N CAPT FOSTER (LFF-2) ANO LAOUEETA MONTGOMERY (PhO) ON
JAN 90
AS REQUESTED IN REFS A AND B, DESIGN AUTH GRANTED FOR PROJS
)92R ANO PE221R. ADDITIONAL AlE FUNOS IAO S33,000 ARE PROVIOEO FOR
•ISE PROJS.
AtE FUNDS IAO $68,000 ARE PROVIOEO FOR SITE INVESTIGATIONS ON
DJS PE093R, PE090R, PE09SR, ANO PE096R.}
OPBUD FUNQ AUTH UNOER 1701106 REVISED AS F0L3:




1, OBLIGATION AUTH INCREASEO 1101*000
F, OPBUD AM£N0 FOLS
G. FUNOS WILL BE APPLIED TO MAINTENANCE FLOOR
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ATTN: Library, Code 0142
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
3. Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code FD) 1
ATTN: Colonel William M. Kay
Headquarters, United States Marine Corps
Washington, DC 20380-0001
4. Commander General, MARINE FORCES, Pacific (AC/s Compt.) 1
ATTN: Colonel G.E. Heaivilin
Camp Smith, Hawaii 96861-5001
5. Commanding General (Code BCD 1
ATTN: Lt. Colonel C. Pardo
Marine Corps Base
Camp Pendleton, California 92055-5000
6. Commanding General (Code IFA) 1
ATTN: Mr. D. Angel
Marine Corps Air Station
El Toro, California 92709-5001
7. Station Comptroller 1
ATTN: Maj. W.H. Gaffney
Marine Corps Air Station
Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii 96863-5001
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8. Prof. R. Doyle (Code AS/Dy)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
9. Prof. L.R. Jones (Code AS/Jn)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000





11. Capt. R.M. McGuiness
6400 6th Ave. North
St. Petersburg, Florida 33710
12. Capt. John D. Barth
3108 Aquia Dr.
Stafford, Virginia 22554
/ yv
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